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Comparative Institutional Analysis of
Product Safety Systems in the
United States and Japan:
Alternative Approaches to Create
Incentives for Product Safety
Hiroshi Sarumida*
Introduction
Promoting product safety is a primary policy goal in every modem society.
In the United States, product safety has been one of the most important
public policies, especially over the past thirty years.' The European Com-
munity considered product safety a basic requirement for the creation of a
single market system.2 In an effort to establish a more consumer-oriented
product liability system, Japan recently enacted the "Product Liability
Law," which would further increase product safety.3
An important consideration in achieving optimal product safety is
how a product safety system can more effectively encourage manufacturers
to reduce product risks. Today, consumers use numerous products whose
adverse effects they may have never anticipated: asbestos,4 silicon
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1. See generally LAURENCE P. F .DMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION: PROBLEMS AND PROS-
PECrs (1976).
2. Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws in the European Community in 1992, 18
WM. MiTcHEL L. Rev. 357, 371 (1992).
3. After years of considerable discussion, the Japanese parliament enacted the Prod-
uct Liability Law which enables Japanese courts to apply strict liability-based tort law to
product liability cases. PL Hi ga seiritsu [The Product Liability Law Has Been Enacted],
MAIncm SmNBUN, June 23, 1994, at 1. This law has been in effect since July 1995.
4. Asbestos was commonly used as a fire retardant in building construction. Since
discovering that the fiber was a carcinogen, however, the United States has experienced
an increase in suits brought by asbestos victims. Experts predict that by the end of the
century as many as 200,000 American deaths will be caused by asbestos-related dis-
29 ComRmL IN r' .J. 79 (1996)
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implants,5 lead paint,6 all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), 7 and even disposable cig-
arette lighters.8 It is sometimes difficult for consumers to understand the
real causes of injuries and to find effective ways to avoid them, especially
when complex technology is involved. In contrast, manufacturers are often
in a better position to foresee potential risks and prevent possible acciden-
tal injuries. In order to create a more effective product safety system, there-
fore, each country should focus on the type and degree of impact its
product safety system has on manufacturer incentives to reduce product
risks.
The United States and Japan have taken different approaches to
encourage manufacturers to promote product safety. In the United States,
the judicial system has played an important role in encouraging manufac-
turers to reduce product risks. Although American courts have never held
manufacturers liable as insurers for all injuries that result from the use of
their products,9 courts have significantly shifted the burden of accidental
injury prevention from individual consumers to manufacturers. This pol-
icy is designed to create strong incentives for American manufacturers to
promote product safety. The American judicial system has thus attempted
to function as an incentive-creating mechanism for product safety.10
eases. That number is expected to reach 265,000 by the year 2015. Stephen Labaton,
Judges' Panel, Seeing Court Crisis, Combines 26,000 Asbestos Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30,
1991, at Al.
5. Silicon breast implants have been found to cause a variety of immune system
disorders, including connective tissue diseases and autoimmune diseases such as sys-
temic lupus and rheumatoid arthritis. Of the nearly two million women who have had
silicon breast implants, thousands have sued implant makers. Gina Kolata, Fund Pro-
posed for Settling Suits Over Breast Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at A16.
6. Lead-based paint, typically used as a house paint before it was known to be
poisonous, still remains on buildings, and young children often ingest peeling strips of
paint Ingesting the paint (or, sometimes, even absorbing the dust) can cause a range of
health difficulties, from reading disabilities to serious brain damage. According to a
senior Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) scientist, one in nine children under the
age of six has enough lead in his or her blood to place him or her at risk Steven Wald-
man, Lead and Your Kids, NEwswEa, July 15, 1991, at 42, 43. Another study shows
children with high lead levels are six times more likely to have reading disabilities. Id.
7. All-terrain vehicles (ATVs) have caused 1,037 deaths since 1982. John Hood, A
Marketplace For Safety?, CoNsUmERs' REs. MAG., Feb. 1990, at 14.
8. From 1987 to 1989, an estimated annual average of 8,000 residential fires, 180
deaths and 1,040 injuries resulted from children under the age of five playing with light-
ers. Most of these fires were caused by disposable cigarette lighters. Memorandum on
the Cigarette Lighter Project from Linda E. Smith, EPHA, through Dr. Robert D.
Verhalen, Associate Executive Director, Directorate for Epidemiology and Robert E. Frye,
Director, EPHA, to BarbaraJ. Jacobson, Manager, at 3 (Feb. 6, 1992) (unpublished mem-
orandum, on file with author).
9. See Prentis v. Yale Manufacturing Co., 365 N.W. 2d 176, 181-82 (Mich. 1984);
Personson v. Construction Equipment Co., 191 N.W. 2d 465, 466 (Mich. 1971).
10. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Tray-
nor, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice Traynor introduced the concept
of strict liability in torts. He reasoned that imposing "absolute liability" on defective
product manufacturers could most effectively reduce defective product-caused hazards
because manufacturers are more likely to anticipate and prevent product hazards than
consumers. Id. at 440.
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At the same time, the heavy burden of costly litigation on American
industries has caused the American product liability system to be the sub-
ject of reform efforts. In 1990, more than 19,400 product liability cases
were filed in U.S. federal courts.11 An even larger number of cases are
brought in U.S. state courts. 12 Advocates for American manufacturing
companies insist that the current product liability system is so onerous
that it has a significant adverse impact on American business and under-
mines international competitiveness.1 3 Many states have reformed their
tort law in order to limit consumers' incentives to bring a product liability
suit,1 4 and Congress has considered enacting a federal product liability
law which would benefit American manufacturers. 15 Meanwhile, Ameri-
can consumer advocates and trial lawyers regard a less stringent product
liability system as harmful to the interests of consumers and strongly
oppose any reform of the current system.16
In contrast to American courts, the judicial system in Japan has not
played as powerful a role in promoting product safety. Japanese courts
have never promulgated any policy creating manufacturers' incentives for
This reasoning assumes that the threat of "strict" liability can effectively stimulate a
manufacturer's incentive to eliminate a defective product and that, as a result, the
number of product-related accidents will decrease. This has been one of the most
important legal theories of American courts in product liability cases.
11. Product Liability, J. CoM., Apr. 21, 1992, at 8A. Since 1974, the number of prod-
uct liability suits filed in federal courts has increased by 1231%. Some opponents of tort
form argue that these figures are misleading. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything about the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System and Why Not? 140 U. PA. L. REv.
1147, 1155, 1162-66 (1992) (discussing that federal cases constitute only 2% of the
nation's litigation, and the number of change in filings relative to the number of disa-
bling injuries presents a completely different picture from the percentage of change in
filings from a fixed starting point).
Professor Marc Galanter notes that a large portion of federal product liability litiga-
tion consists of asbestos cases, and the number of non-asbestos cases is decreasing.
Marc Galanter, Product Liability Litigation-Myths and Facts, prepared for presentation to
the Fourth Annual Product Liability Conference in Madison, WI (Nov. 5-6, 1992). See
also Marc Galanter, Beyond the Litigation Panic, in NEw Dn cEIONS mN LiABnrry LAW (Wal-
ter Olson ed., 1988); Marc Galanter, The Day After The Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L.
REv. 3 (1986).
12. According to the Court Statistics Project by the National Center of State Courts,
the total number of non-automobile tort cases brought in the courts of seven states in
1990 (Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, and Texas) was
99,144. Galanter, Myths and Facts, supra note 11, at 8. This figure alone far exceeds the
number of product liability cases that have been decided in Japan since World War II.
See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
13. Product Liability Reform Act: Hearings on S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on Con-
sumers of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 39, 40-42 (Feb. 22, 1990) (statement of Wendell L. Willkie, II,
General Counsel, Dep't of Comm.).
14. Mary H. Cooper, Liability Crisis: Is It Over?, EDrroRIAL REs. REP'. 326, 330 (June
1988).
15. Neil A Lewis, Senate, 61-37, Approves Narrow Punitive Damages Curb, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 1995, at B1O. On May 10, 1995, following approval of a similar bill by the
House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate passed a bill adopting a measure restricting
the amount of punitive damages juries may award in product liability lawsuits. Id.
16. See Tracy E. Benson, Product Liability: Deep Waters to Debate, INusrvY WY-,
Aug. 6, 1990, at 46, 51, 54.
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product safety through civil litigation. In civil cases, Japanese courts have
focused solely on allocating the cost of accidents in the cases presented
rather than creating incentives for potential injurers to prevent future acci-
dents. 17 Although courts may encourage manufacturers to reduce risks
through allocating injury-related costs, Japanese courts have imposed dam-
ages that are far lower than those levied by American courts.' 8 More
importantly, the victims of product-related accidents in Japan have rarely
used judicial channels in seeking a remedy. Only 150 product liability
cases were decided between 1945 and 1990 in all of Japan. 19
As a result, litigation and the associated costs when their products
cause injuries have not been as important a concern forJapanese manufac-
turers as for their American counterparts. According to a survey conducted
for American manufacturers regarding their product safety practices (the
"PSP survey"), 20 most responded that legal fees were one of the most
important concerns when their products caused accidental injuries. How-
ever, a Japanese survey showed that not many Japanese companies were
seriously concerned about litigation-related costs in the same situation.2 1
(See Table I)
The minimal role of the Japanese courts in creating a product safety
system may lead one to wonder whether the system has failed altogether to
create incentives for manufacturers to reduce product risks. The threat of
civil liability is not the only way to encourage manufacturers to improve
product safety. Safety legislation and regulations can require manufactur-
ers to reduce potential product risks. In response to consumer demands,
manufacturers sometimes make efforts to improve product safety without
the threat of either liability or penalties.
17. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 74-75 and accompanying text.
19. Yasuda Research Institute summarized 141 product liability cases litigated in
Japan between 1949-89. YASUDA SOGO KENKYOSHO [YASUDA RESEARCH INSTITuTE],
SEIZOBUTSU SEMUNn [PRODUCT LInurrv] 403-66 (2d ed. 1991).
20. This survey was conducted by the author for 107 American manufacturers par-
ticipating in five product safety conferences held in Madison, Wisconsin, between
November 1992 and October 1993. 1 will refer to this survey as "the PSP survey," distin-
guishing it from other surveys conducted by the author. See Appendix I.
21. AIU INSURANCE COMPANY, PL CHOSA HOKOKUSHO [THE REPORT OF CoMPANIEs'
PRODUCt LiinnrrY Poucms] (1991).
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Table 122
Major Concerns of Manufacturers in Their
Product-related Accidents
Manufacturers selected all applicable answers
Japanese manufacturers [1] (%) U.S. manufacturers [21 (%)
1 Compensation 74.3 1 Litigation fees 68.2
2 Negotiation with victims 50.8 2 Criticism against company 64.5
3 Reduction of Sales 45.5 3 Compensation 59.8
4 Criticism against company 44.4 4 Reduction of Sales 47.7
5 Litigation fees 32 5 Costs for recall 34.6
6 Costs for recall 27.8 6 Negotiation with victims 25.2
Others 4.3 Others 20.6
N/A 0.4 N/A 6.5
[1] Percentage of Japanese manufacturers responding in given category
[2] Percentage of U.S. manufacturers responding in given category
Number of responding manufacturers:
Japan: 930 U.S.: 107
Certain Japanese governmental bodies and industry groups emphasize
that the existing approaches, such as safety regulations and voluntary
safety measures by manufacturers, have worked adequately in Japan.3
These groups had opposed legislation of the Product Liability Law in Japan
that might encourage victims of product-related accidents to seek
compensation through litigation while giving the courts more
opportunities to promote product safety. Until a few years ago, the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the most powerful
ministry with regard to Japanese industrial and economic policies, was
reluctant to support the legislation, arguing that Japanese consumers were
"duly protected by existing safety standards." 24 Japanese manufacturers,
also opposing adoption of the Product Liability Law, stressed their
voluntary efforts towards improving product safety through quality
control, customer service, and additional product safety efforts in product
22. Table I indicates the priorities ofJapanese and U.S. manufacturer concerns. No
comparison of actual percentages is made due to differences in the basic methodologies
and the number of responding manufacturers in the two surveys.
23. See Kokumin Seikatsu Shingikai Sh6hisha Seisaku Bukai [Consumer Policy
Division, Social Policy Council], Sdg~teki na Shohisha Higai Bdshi, Kyfisai no Arikata ni
tsuite, Kokumin Seikatsu Shingikai Shihisha Seisaku Bukai Chukan Hlkoku [Towards a
Comprehensive Preventive and Remedial System for Consumer Accidents, The Interim
Report by the Consumer Policy Division in the Social Policy Council], 991 Jtumsr 46, 48-49
(1991).
24. Takumi Anzai, Fires Prompt Callfor Product Liability Law; Manufacturers Urged to
Improve Safety Record, THE Nuami Wx.y., Aug. 15, 1992, at 9. MITI came to agree to the
legislation "if the new law could harmonize consumer protection with economic
activities." Dokomade Toeruka Kigy5 Sekinin [How Much Can We Seek Corporate
Liability?], MAMnMCHI SHNBN, Nov. 17, 1993.
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design and quality control.25
Given that effective alternatives to litigation exist in Japan, including
government regulation or voluntary corporate efforts for product safety,
this Article examines whether Japan needs to make its judicial system a
more powerful incentive-creating mechanism. In addition, it examines
what impact such a system may have on manufacturers' incentives to
promote product safety. This Article analyzes these questions by
comparing the two distinct product safety systems in the United States and
Japan. This comparative analysis also considers whether the American
judicial system is currently an effective incentive-creating mechanism.
This Article focuses on the characteristics of three institutional
mechanisms: judicial systems, political institutions (legislature or
government agencies), and market mechanisms, while examining the
effects of each mechanism on manufacturers' incentives to promote
product safety. 26 By analyzing advantages and disadvantages of each
mechanism under American and Japanese product safety systems, this
Article examines how the three types of incentive-creating mechanisms
either successfully or unsuccessfully encourage manufacturers to reduce
product risk.
The analysis in this Article encompasses alternative approaches for
promoting product safety and the impact of a product safety system on
manufacturers' incentives to promote product safety. Goals other than
promoting product safety, such as compensation for product-related
injuries, can be a primary aim of a product safety system. Maintaining a
competitive edge in world trade or promoting "harmonious" international
relations may also be goals of a product safety system.. In U.S. tort reform
discussions, a major concern is that American industries are losing their
competitive strength in the world economy. In discussions concerning
Japan's product liability system, concerns over foreign criticism that
Japanese manufacturers were competing unfairly without a product
liability law in their domestic market motivated the Japanese government
to establish a new system.2 7
25. Seiz~butsu Sehinin HO: Sakiokurini Takamaru Kanshin [Product Liability Law:
People Are More Concerned about the Postponed Legislation], YoMlUIm SHINBUN, Oct. 20,
1992, at 17.
26. For a detailed analysis of these three institutional U.S. tort reform mechanisms,
see Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 23 (1990).
27. Yoko Inoue, Consumers Press for More Protection, THE JAPAN EcoN. J., Oct. 22,
1990, at 3. BecauseJapanese products in the American market are subject to American
liability law, this argument may be disingenuous. However, in recent trade negotiations
between Japan and the United States, such as the Structural Impediment Initiative (511),
both governments pointed to each other's domestic market structural problems. Id. In
addition, some American manufacturers criticize the different policies of Japanese
companies, especially their different pricing policies, in the American market as
compared to those in the Japanese market. Japanese companies as well as the
government are apprehensive regarding factors which contribute to different policies in
the two markets. These conflicts are mostly associated with trade issues. For example,
in 1992, the American automobile industry filed dumping charges against Japanese-
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This Article, however, assumes that promotion of product safety is the
primary policy goal and that allocation of product risks is a means of
promoting product safety. Specifically, the central issue in this Article is
how much impact a product safety system may have on manufacturers'
incentives for product safety rather than the actual status of product
liability litigation and safety regulations in both countries. For example, if
manufacturers believe that the "litigation explosion" exists and, as a result,
take steps to avoid "potential" liability, this Article considers such a judicial
system as a successful incentive-creating mechanism. This is so even
though the chance that the manufacturers would be sued and have
stringent liability imposed is not really as high as they may believe.
Similarly, despite the number of existing safety regulations, this Article
does not consider political institutions as effective incentive-creating
mechanisms if those regulations do not significantly impact
manufacturers' incentives to promote product safety.
Part I of this Article explains the basic characteristics of judicial
systems, political institutions, and market mechanisms as incentive-
creating mechanisms for product safety. Part II examines how the
American and Japanese judicial systems function or fail to function as
incentive-creating mechanisms and the factors which influence their
abilities. Part III investigates the limitations of political institutions,
highlighting the characteristic mechanisms of the Japanese political
institutions. Part IV examines the limitations of market mechanisms as
incentive-creating mechanisms, explaining the distinctive features of
Japanese market mechanisms. Considering the impact of a possible reform
of the Japanese product safety system, Part V examines the effects of
judicially oriented incentive-creating mechanisms on other institutional
mechanisms and the impact on manufacturers' motivation to promote
product safety.
I. Incentive-creating Mechanisms
To illustrate different kinds of incentive-creating mechanisms, this Article
utilizes an analytical medium, an incentive signal. This part defines incen-
tive signals and examines their characteristics in judicial systems, political
institutions, and market mechanisms. After categorizing the product risks
into four types, this part analyzes the ability of incentive signals created by
each institutional mechanism to "target" each type of product risk
A. Incentive Signals
An incentive signal is an institutional demand for manufacturers to
improve product safety. Each institutional mechanism-judicial systems,
political institutions, and market mechanisms-can send manufacturers
incentive signals, encouraging them to improve the product safety. Profes-
sor Neil Komesar examined the relative abilities of three institutions (the
made mini-vans because their price in the United States was "indeed" lower. Doron P.
Levin, G.M. May Not Join in Move Against Japan, N.Y. TnMEs, Feb. 8, 1993, at D2.
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torts system, criminal law and administrative regulations, and the market)
to prevent injuries.28 Komesar described a "signal" to potential injurers
created by the torts system as follows:
In the tort system .... incentives [to alter behaviors of potential injurers] take
the form of potential damage awards and the other costs associated with tort
liability (out-of-pocket expenses for lawyers, witnesses, and investigation, as
well as time spent and aggravation). These incentives form a signal sent by
the torts system to potential injurers.2 9
In addition to signals sent by courts, manufacturers receive incentive sig-
nals from laws and regulations supported by the threat of enforcement. In
a competitive market, consumer demand for safer products also sends
incentive signals.
Each institutional mechanism, however, may also send signals which
do not encourage manufacturers to take any safety measures or, some-
times, may encourage them to produce less safe products. For example,
when courts fail to impose liability, the government lowers safety standards
of regulations, or consumers demand more dangerous products, signals
from these institutional mechanisms fail to create manufacturers' incen-
tives to improve product safety. Accordingly, this Article does not include
these negative signals within the meaning of incentive signals.
Although institutional mechanisms create and send signals to manu-
facturers, they do so in different ways. To illustrate, assume a number of
people are injured in similar types of product-related accidents such as a
fire caused by a child with a cigarette lighter. A judicial system has the
opportunity to create signals only when actual victims of the fire bring
lawsuits through private legal counsel against lighter manufacturers. 30
Courts send incentive signals to manufacturers when they hold the manu-
facturers liable for the damages, and the manufacturers estimate expected
losses from litigation to exceed the profits gained by not taking safety
measures, such as producing a lighter without a child-proof device.3 1
28. Komesar, supra note 26. Professor Komesar's comparative institutional analysis
focuses on the different impact per capita of a given injury on four important groups
concerned with the prevention of accidents: actual victims, actual injurers, potential
victims, and potential injurers. Id. at 32-33.
29. Komesar, supra note 26, at 28 (emphasis added).
30. Professor Komesar describes the role of actual victims in the tort system as
follows:
In the torts system, actual victims control the prosecution of legal actions. They
decide on the target of prosecution, investigate and prepare their actions, and
present them to the liability determiner. They hire experts, most importantly
lawyers, to help .... In the torts system, the behavior of victims and their lawyer-
partners takes center stage. The system depends on these actors to bring and
prosecute cases, and if they do not act, the system will not function.
Komesar, supra note 26, at 27.
31. Although the most significant litigation-related losses for manufacturers would
be liability damages, the expected losses from litigation also include other costs, includ-
ing those associated with time, reductions in sales due to adverse publicity, and the
possibility of extended liability in future cases.
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Political institutions can send incentive signals when laws and regula-
tions require higher safety standards and the targeted manufacturers pre-
dict that the possible impact of enforcement exceeds the profits gained by
not following regulatory schemes. 32 Thus, if the legislature enacts a law
requiring lighter manufacturers to make lighters child-resistant and lighter
manufacturers expect that losses resulting from prosecution and penalties
will outweigh profits gained by not following the law, the manufacturers
have incentives to produce child-proof lighters. Signals sent by political
institutions usually target certain types of manufacturers and their conduct
by providing specific product and production standards, in contrast to
abstract concepts often found in court rulings.33
In addition to signals created by judicial systems and political institu-
tions, consumer demand creates signals in a marketplace. To the extent
that consumers demand safer products, manufacturers receive incentive
signals. 34 If more and more consumers demand child-resistant lighters
and lighter manufacturers estimate higher profits by selling them, manu-
facturers receive incentive signals and choose to produce child-proof light-
ers. Failure to immediately respond to signals may cause a reduction of
sales or a loss of market share.
B. Types of Product Risks
To promote comprehensive product safety, incentive signals need to target
various kinds of product risk. This Article categorizes product risk
targeted by incentive signals into four groups based on the severity of the
injuries and the probability of the occurrence. 35 (See Figure 1)
32. The impact of enforcement is determined by the frequency of the prosecution
and the amount of the penalties. See infra Part ULI.A.4. Unlike the tort system, actual
victims do not usually participate in the prosecution. Komesar, supra note 26, at 29.
33. Because of their complexity, administrative regulations may be difficult to under-
stand. However, the standards are usually more concrete than those found in court
rulings.
34. Komesar, supra note 26, at 31.
35. These two factors have been of key concern in the American tort system. Judge
Learned Hand defined the legal standard of negligence as follows: "[I]f the probability
of injury be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends on whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL." United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Contemporary American courts are still concerned
about these factors in applying strict liability, especially in design defect cases. See, e.g.,
Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Courts examine
whether the benefits of a certain product design outweigh the risks of the design (the
risk/utility approach). See, e.g., Baker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal.
1976). In reaching a decision, courts consider the gravity of the danger posed by the
product design and the likelihood of the danger as well as other factors, such as feasibil-
ity of the alternate designs, the financial cost of an improved design and the adverse
consequences of the alternate design. Id.
87
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Figure 136
Types of Product Risks
Type III Type I
IHigh High
Low High




The scope of victims (or potential victims) under this model is limited
to users of certain products or groups of people related to the products,
such as construction workers using asbestos materials or children of dieth-
ylstilbestrol (DES) users. In silicon implant cases, for example, the poten-
tial victims are women using silicon implants or women who may consider
implants, rather than all consumers.37
36. A product safety manager of Graco Inc., used a similar kind of chart to explain
what kinds of potential hazards manufacturers should warn against. Bruce Mcintosh,
Address at the Role of Warnings and Instructions Program in Madison, WI (Mar. 18-19,
1993) (unpublished chart, on file with author).
This article refers to types of product risk as "Type I risk," "Type II risk," "Type III
risk," or "Type IV risk," and injury caused by types of product risk as "Type I injury,"
"Type II injury," "Type III injury," or "Type IV injury."
37. This article attempts to differentiate types of product-related injuries by limiting
the scope of actual and potential victims to users and product-related persons rather
than all consumers. In Professor Komesar's analysis, the scope of potential victims in
product related accidents includes all consumers. Komesar, supra note 26, at 32-33.
Therefore, the per capita impact of potential victims (consumers) is low relative to that
of potential injurers.
His analysis of a given injury's per capita impact on four important groups: actual
victims, actual injurers, potential victims, and potential injurers, is as follows:
[Assuming the total impact on society of a given injury is $100 million per year,]
low per capita impact for actual victims means that there are a large number of
actual victims (e.g., 10 million) each of whom suffers a small loss ($10 each),
while high per capita impact per actual injurer means that there are a few injur-
ers (e.g., 10) each of whom equally produces the injury ($10 million each).
... Potential impact can be described by the probability that the injury occurs
and the extent of the resulting injury. Imagine, for example, that each member
of a population of 10 million potential victims faces a probability of .0001 (1/
10,000) of an injury which will impose a loss of $100,000. In this situation, we
would expect 1,000 actual injuries with each victim suffering a loss of
$100,000. But the expected loss per potential victim is $10 (.0001 x $100,000).
Low per capita impact among potential injurers has the same characteristics-
large societal injury spread among many injurers. High per capita impact
among potential injurers involves a smaller number of potential injurers
exposed to a large number of events.
Id.
According to this theory, product-related accident cases have a high per capita impact
on both actual victims and injurers. Id. However, the per capita impact on potential
Vol. 29
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Type I risks are those that cause severe injuries with a high probability
of occurrence among users or identifiable groups of people otherwise
related to the products. For example, in defective drug cases, such as the
Dalkon Shield cases, 38 a number of users are exposed to a high probability
of severe injuries. Type II risks also cause severe injuries, but they do so
less frequently than Type I risks. For example, even if the aggregated
number of fires caused by children playing with cigarette lighters is signifi-
cant, rarely will a smoker have a small child, buy a disposable lighter, place
the lighter in the child's reach, and the child, in the parent's absence, acci-
dentally start a fire. 39 However, once the fire occurs, it may cause signifi-
cant damage and severe injuries.
In contrast, Type III risks cause only minor injuries or damages but
contain a high probability occurrence. Even though a disposable cigarette
lighter may not light easily, the ensuing damage to the user is only the cost
of the lighter and, probably, the inconvenience. Type IV risks are those
which cause only small damages and have a low probability of occurrence.
These four types of product risk could arise from products that deviate
from the standards of similar products (manufacturing defects), products
that have inherent risk-creating elements (design defects), or products lack-
ing adequate safety warnings (warning defects).
Several finer points arise within this framework First, one product
may contain different types of product risk. For example, automobiles
carry Type II and III risks because automobiles can cause minor injuries
(Type III risks) as well as death (Type II risks).40 Sometimes, the risks a
product presents to various groups of people may differ. In diethylstilbes-
trol (DES) cases, the risk of injuries to the third generation of DES users is
victims (consumers) is low. Id. In contrast, the per capita impact on the relatively small
number of (but large-scale) potential injurers (manufacturers) is high. Id. Because of
this, signals created in the tort system strongly encourage manufacturers to expend the
resources necessary to understand signal contents and change their behavior to promote
product safety as necessary. Id.
38. Dalkon Shield, which is an intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD), has caused
serious pelvic infections in thousands of users. Cooper, supra note 14, at 335. See infra
note 59 and accompanying text. If likelihood of injuries is high among the users of
certain products, such injuries are considered "Type I injuries."
39. Every year, 600 million cigarette lighters are sold in the United States. Regula-
tion of Products Subject to Other Costs under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 57 Fed.
Reg. 36,929 (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1145) [hereinafter Lighter Regulation].
Assuming that lighter-related fires started by children were caused by lighters sold in the
year when the fires occurred, only 0.008% of all lighters sold every year could be tracea-
ble to such fires.
40. The risk of fatal automobile accidents is not a Type I risk but a Type II risk
Although traffic accidents cause a significant number of deaths every year in the United
States and Japan, the number of deaths per 1,000 cars is 0.236 in the United States and
0.241 in Japan. UNYU-SHOJIDOsHA KoTsu-KvOKu [DIVIsION OF AUTOMOBILE AFFAiRs: Mm-
IsrRY OF TRaFIc AFFAIRS], JIDOSHA NO ANZEN KAKUHO NO TAMENO KONGO NO Gyorsumia
HosAMu Ni TsurrE--UNYu GijuTsu SHINGIKAT To sHIN-[PERspEcnvE OF TECHNOLOGY AND
POLICY FOR PROMOTION OF CAR SAFrY] (1992). These figures indicate much lower fatal-
ity risk than that of DES. See infra note 42.
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a Type 11 risk because of the lower probability, 41 while the risk to the sec-
ond generation is a Type I risk.42 In asbestos cases, while the risk of can-
cer to workers using asbestos materials is a Type I risk, the risk to people
living in houses with asbestos is a Type II risk.43
Second, injuries caused by mass disaster accidents are not necessarily
Type I injuries, even though certain products may cause severe injuries to a
number of people in a single accident. When only a small percentage of a
certain type of product causes mass disaster accidents and, therefore, only
a small fraction of total users suffers severe injury, the product carries Type
II risks rather than Type I risks. For example, the risk of an airplane crash
is a Type II risk owing to the low probability of its occurrence. 44
Third, injuries caused by Type III risks include the user's discomfort
and inconvenience as well as minor injuries. Therefore, users of products
may neither consider these trivial injuries seriously, nor acknowledge
them as "injuries" until manufacturers create new products which make
users feel more "comfortable." The distinguishing characteristic of Type III
risks, however, is that a high percentage of the products cause a large
number of users to have the same kinds of minor injuries, inconvenience,
or discomfort.
Each institutional mechanism contributes to promoting comprehen-
sive product safety when it successfully encourages manufacturers to
change Type I, 11, and III risks into Type IV risks. However, reducing all
types of product risk may not be socially desirable if the associated costs
are unreasonably high. In particular, reducing Type 11 risks may increase
significantly the prices of products, decrease consumer demand, and
lessen the level of production. As a result, fewer types of products would
be available to the public.
Nevertheless, the costs of reducing a Type II risk may decrease as tech-
nology develops, while the costs of accidents may not. Even though the
costs of safety measures currently exceed those of potential accidents, man-
ufacturers could invest resources to reduce the costs of the safety measures
if institutional mechanisms would, at least occasionally, demand such
41. Recently, the New York Court of Appeals denied a cause of action on behalf of a
"third generation" victim of DES. Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377, 570 N.E.2d
198 (N.Y. 1991).
42. DES causes cancer in one in every thousand "DES daughters," and as many as
90% of DES daughters have adenosis, an abnormality of the vagina. Michael Kinsley,
Fate and Lawsuits, NEw REPUBLIC, June 14, 1980, at 20.
43. According to Lawrence Fitzpatrick, President of the Center for Claims Resolu-
tion, all of the more than 200,000 people who have filed personal injury claims against
asbestos manufacturers experienced occupational exposure instead of exposure from
being in buildings with asbestos materials. Matthew L. Wald, Experts Say Fear of Asbes-
tos Exceeds the Risk in Schools, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 4, 1993, at 1.
44. In response to Ralph Nader's criticisms of airline safety in the United States,
James E. Landry said that a person had a greater chance of being killed by lightning than
dying in an airline accident. Edwin McDowell, New Nader Book Attacks Record Of Safety
of Airlines and F.AA, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 4, 1993, at 9.
Type 11 risks of mass disaster accidents, however, tend to be exaggerated by the media
and, as a result, users (or potential users) may believe that the risks are Type I risks. See
infra Part III.A.1.
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safety measures. 45 As a result, the cost of safety, which is currently unrea-
sonably high, may be "reasonable" in the future. For example, an Ameri-
can lighter manufacturer developed a child-resistant lighter at the cost of
ten million dollars and after five years of research.46 Nowadays, this safety
device costs ten to forty cents per disposable lighter.47 This cost is much
lower than the per lighter cost of child-play lighter fires, which is sixty to
seventy-five cents.48
Based on the premise that sending continuous incentive signals to
manufacturers is one of the most effective approaches to achieving long-
term comprehensive product safety, this Article analyzes different func-
tions of incentive-creating mechanisms in the United States and Japan. The
examination of the number of signals that must be given to manufacturers
to bring about the most socially desirable result for each kind of product-
related injury case is beyond the scope of this Article. Even though the
costs of safety measures are currently more expensive than the costs of
potential accidents, this Article does not conclude at once that the institu-
tional demand for those safety measures is unreasonable. If, however,
incentive signals target a Type II risk rather than a Type I risk when one
product has both types of risks, this Article regards such signals as socially
undesirable.
C. Types of Product Risks and Institutional Mechanisms
The ability of incentive signals to target certain types of product risks dif-
fers among the three institutional mechanisms. Although the process of
creating incentive signals in the judicial system begins with actual victims
bringing lawsuits, the transaction costs of litigation significantly influence
the kinds of cases brought by victims. As such, relatively high transaction
costs result in victims deciding to use the judicial system only when the
expected damages are significant. Therefore, the judicial system has more
opportunities to target severe injuries, such as Type I and II injuries.
Signals sent by a judicial system become incentive signals only when
manufacturers who create product risks estimate that the expected losses
related to litigation exceed the profits gained by not taking safety meas-
ures. Because the manufacturers' expected losses from Type I risks are
very high, such risks compel manufacturers to consider safety measures.
45. In cases concerning fires caused by lighters, only one federal court has held that
a lighter manufacturer has a duty to make its lighters child-resistant. Bondie v. Bic Co.,
739 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Mich. 1990). Other courts have stated that such a duty does not
exist. See Griggs v. Bic Co., 786 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Although the
signals sent by courts are inconsistent, some lighter manufacturers have developed a
child-resistant lighter at a significant cost despite the lack of any mandatory standard
enforceable by a government agency. Bic Unveils New Disposable Lighter With Child-
Resistant Safety Feature, 19 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA), No. 35, at 996 (Aug. 30,
1991).
46. Bic Unveils New Disposable Lighter With Child-Resistant Safety Feature, supra note
45.
47. Lighter Regulation, supra note 39, at 36,947.
48. Griggs v. Bic Co., 61 U.S.L.W. 2415 (CA3 Dec. 31, 1992).
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Even if specific safety measures are not available to manufacturers, signifi-
cant expected losses strongly encourage manufacturers to invest in devel-
oping cost-justifiable safety. A judicial system, however, is less likely to
send incentive signals targeting Type II risks to manufacturers. Because
the probability of injury is low in the Type II risk context, manufacturers
may decide to bear the tort liability and include litigation-associated costs
in the price of products. 49
The legislature and administrative agencies create signals by enacting
laws and regulations, and government prosecutors and agents send these
signals by prosecuting violators. In the legislative process, various kinds of
groups represent their interests and attempt to manipulate possible legisla-
tive and regulatory schemes in their favor. In product safety-related legisla-
tion, however, groups of manufacturers tend to be more organized and able
to spend more on political activities than consumers.5 0 Legislative bodies,
administrative agencies, prosecutors and public officials are all subject to
the strong political influence of manufacturers. 5 '
Political institutions, however, do not always compromise the interests
of consumers on behalf of manufacturers. The representation of consumer
interests can overcome the political influence of manufacturers when con-
sumers are aware of product risks and desire protection enough to spend
the resources necessary to support advocacy groups. Because Type I and
III injuries have high probabilities of occurring, users of these products
tend to know what the potential product risks are. Type Ill risks, however,
are less likely to motivate consumers to seek political action due to the low
severity involved. For example, even if a lighter often fails to light, no con-
sumer will be interested in political action against lighter manufacturers
because of the inconvenience or discomfort.
Political institutions are good at sending incentive signals to Type I
risk-creating manufacturers. The actual victims of Type I injuries and
some public-minded professionals, such as groups of doctors or lawyers,
often organize politically for consumer protection from such injuries.5 2
Moreover, mass media tend to apprise the public of Type I risks and some-
times exaggerate their impact on consumers as a whole. As a result, polit-
ical institutions are more likely to create incentive signals for targeting
Type I risks.
49. This is one of the important rationales behind the theory of strict liability as
expressed in American product liability cases. In his concurring opinion in Escola, Jus-
tice Traynor stated that "the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and dis-
tributed among the public as a cost of doing business." Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944).
50. Professor Komesar attributes this power differential between potential injurers(manufacturers) and potential victims (consumers) to their different per capita impact.
Komesar, supra note 26, at 41-42. See also supra note 37.
51. Komesar, supra note 26, at 42.
52. In mostJapanese mass-tort product liability cases, a group of lawyers and public
organizations devotedly support victims. Japan Federation of Bar Association, Shuji
Nakamura, Wagakuni no Kekkan Sy6hin Mondai no GenO [The Situation of Defective Prod-
uct-related Problems in Japan], 41-10 LmRTY & JusTicE 14 (Sept. 1990).
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In contrast, incentive signals from political institutions do not target
Type II risks effectively. Because these product risks cause severe injuries
but have a low probability of occurrence, only a small number of users
become the victims of Type II injuries. It is difficult for these victims to
organize politically and defeat the political influence of manufacturers.
These victims may also find it difficult to seek help from public-minded
professionals because the smaller number of claims from victims is less
likely to encourage those professionals to work as political activists. As a
result, political institutions are less likely to send incentive signals to Type
II risk-creating manufacturers. 53
Consumer demand creates incentive signals through market mecha-
nisms. In order to attract more users and increase sales of their products,
manufacturers compete with each other to enhance customer satisfaction
by responding to the demands of as many users (or potential users) as
possible. If consumers find that one manufacturer's products often cause
injuries or inconvenience, the consumers will choose another manufac-
turer's products. Therefore, manufacturers try to produce products that
users believe are more reliable.5 4
Incentive signals created by market mechanisms are good at targeting
product risks which have a high probability of occurrence, such as Type I
and III risks. Manufacturers place a high priority on reducing Type I risks
because these can jeopardize their corporate image and, as a result, signifi-
candy reduce product sales. Although Type III risks may not induce manu-
facturers to take immediate steps for product safety, manufacturers try to
reduce Type III risks to attract more customers. Failing to decrease Type III
risks may cause a reduction in sales and a loss of market share.
Because the probability of occurrence is low, however, Type II risks are
less likely to influence the market demand of a majority of customers
unless the probability is exaggerated. If a majority of users are satisfied
with products and continue to demand them, it is difficult to encourage
manufacturers to take safety measures which reduce a product's Type II
risks. Therefore, incentive signals created by market mechanisms are less
likely to target Type II risks.
Incentive signals from each institutional mechanism can succeed in
targeting Type I risks. Also, in a competitive market, manufacturers will
attempt to reduce Type III risks in the pursuit of profits. Thus, the issue is
how each institutional mechanism can create incentive signals to target
Type II risks. Parts II, III and IV of this Article focus on how judicial sys-
tems, political institutions, and market mechanisms in the United States
53. The media may exaggerate Type II risks, but they are more likely to cover dra-
matic Type I injury-related accidents to get a larger audience. If an agency takes an
action against Type II risks, it runs the risk of being critized for overlooking more impor-
tant issues. For examples of those criticisms, see Hood, supra note 7, at 14.
54. See infra notes 278-86 and accompanying text for an example of manufacturers'
strong incentives to improve product reliability. Market mechanisms do not work as an
incentive-creating mechanism if potential victims are not product users but instead are
people related to the products. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
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and Japan encourage, or fail to encourage, manufacturers to reduce various
product risks, especially Type II risk reduction.
II. American and Japanese Judicial Systems as Incentive-creating
Mechanisms
There is a significant difference in the number of product liability cases
with which American courts and Japanese courts deal."5 This section
surveys the types of product risk each judicial system tends to target and its
impact on manufacturers through damage systems, policies created by the
judiciary, and the image of the judicial system created by media or social
norm. This section also examines three factors affecting the ability of the
American and Japanese judicial systems to be incentive-creating mecha-
nisms: lawyers, legal theories, and decision-makers.
A. Targets of Incentive Signals
1. Targets of the American Judicial System
The American judicial system sends a large number of signals to manufac-
turers which create product risks as people use judicial channels to seek
reimbursement for the costs of product-related accidents. Its primary tar-
get has been Type I risks. In the current debate over tort reform in the
United States, some commentators emphasize that a substantial portion of
product liability litigation in the United States consists of mass-tort cases,
such as asbestos and defective drug-related cases. 5 6 Among product liabil-
ity cases filed at federal district courts between 1985 and 1990, asbestos
cases represented 55.9% on average. 57 The majority of plaintiffs is com-
prised of those who suffered occupational exposure (Type I risk) rather
than those who absorbed asbestos in daily life (Type II risk).5 8 Another
example of Type I injury victims successfully using the judicial system is
seen in the Dalkon Shield (an intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD))
cases. Dalkon Shields have caused serious pelvic infections in thousands
of users. According to a 1988 report, the Dalkon Shield manufacturer paid
more than $340,000,000 to plaintiffs, and 200,000 cases were still
pending.5 9
Generally, American courts have awarded larger damages to the vic-
tims of Type I injury cases. The average damage award in a sampling of
asbestos cases, most of which belong to Type I injury cases,60 is
55. See supra notes 11, 12, 19 and accompanying text.
56. Galanter, Beyond the Litigation Panic, supra note 11, at 24.
57. These figures are based on information provided by the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts Annual Report, excerpted in Galanter, Myths and Facts, supra note 11.
58. Wald, supra note 43.
59. Cooper, supra note 14, at 335.
60. The victims in most asbestos cases in the sampling consist of workers using
asbestos materials. 3410 Awards By Product, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH), I 7755-7903(June 1993) [hereinafter Damage Awards].
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$956,061.61 In contrast, the average awards in a sampling of industry
machinery/equipment-related cases and household product-related cases,
which tend to be Type II injury cases, are $342,422 and $445,671 respec-
tively.62 Furthermore, according to an empirical study of punitive dam-
ages, the most powerful incentive signal in the American judicial system,
27% of punitive damages awarded from 1986 to 1990 were for the victims
of asbestos cases, and 15% were for victims of accidents related to medical
products, including breast implants, contraceptive devices, and drugs. 6 3
As a result, the American judicial system has compelled Type I risk-
creating manufacturers not only to reduce the risks but also to discontinue
product lines and close down some of these companies.6 4 In various
forms, the American judicial system, through its incentive signals, has led
Type I risk-creating manufacturers to "reduce" product risk. The American
judicial system has also sent incentive signals targeting Type II risks.
While Type I injury cases make up the bulk of American product liability
suits, a significant number of Type II injury cases exist at both the federal
and state court levels.6 5 Damage awards in these Type II injury cases are
often as high as those awarded in Type I injury cases.6 6 Moreover, juries in
product liability cases have awarded punitive damages not only for the vic-
tims of Type I injury cases, but also for victims of accidental injuries
caused by recreational products, household products, and machinery,6 7 all
of which tend to contain Type II rather than Type I risks.
More importantly, the media and political propaganda provided by
tort reform supporters in the United States have reinforced the incentive
signals sent to Type II risk-creating manufacturers. The media and polit-
ical propaganda often publicize a large number of lawsuits as well as high
61. This information is based on Damage Awards, supra note 60. The cases intro-
duced in this Damage Awards section are not an exhaustive listing of all U.S. product
liability cases. Id. Nevertheless, the information provides a general idea regarding the
varying amounts of damage awards in asbestos cases and other product-related cases.
Id.
62. Id.
63. MicHAEL. RusrAD, DEMYSrIFYING PuNmVIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCT LiABIrY CASES: A
SURVEY OF A QuARTER CENTURY OF TRmt VERDicrs 26 (Lee Hays Romano ed., 1991).
64. Making a manufacturer take additional safety measures is not the only way to
reduce product risk Requiring a manufacturer to reduce production levels or to stop
producing dangerous products is another effective way, especially for Type I accidents.
Closing a company that is creating product risks is a more aggressive way to reduce
product risks. Johns-Manville Corp., one of the biggest asbestos manufacturers, filed a
Chapter 11 petition as a result oflarge damage awards against it. Cooper, supra note 14,
at 335. A.H. Robins Corp., the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, also sought protec-
tion from product liability suits through bankruptcy laws. Id.
65. The "Damage Awards" section of the CCH Product Liability Reporter listed 730
plaintiff-winning cases involving 260 kinds of products or product hazards litigated
between 1963 and 1991. Damage Awards, supra note 60. Most of the accidents in these
cases stem from Type 1I product risks. Id.
66. 108 cases out of 730 plaintiff winning cases listed in the "Damage Awards" sec-
tion of the CCH Product Liability Reporters constitute the "million dollar verdict" cases.
Id. The products subject to million dollar verdicts are not only Type I risk-related prod-
ucts but also Type It risk-related product, such as lawn mowers and helmets. Id.
67. RusrAD, supra note 63, at 26.
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jury award cases, regardless of the type of product risks involved in each
case. As a result, they have created an atmosphere of a liability crisis.6 8
This atmosphere pressures all manufacturers into paying more attention to
product safety issues, regardless of the types of product risks involved.
Therefore, even if the courts do not actually deal with as many Type 1I
injury cases as is widely believed, the American judicial system is still suc-
cessful in sending incentive signals to Type II risk-creating
manufacturers. 69
2. Targets of the Japanese Judicial System
Although the Japanese judicial system has created far fewer signals than the
American judicial system, its primary target also has been Type I risks.
During the last twenty years, the Japanese courts have heard several Type I
injury cases. These Type I injury cases include the PCB-contaminated
Kanemi Rice-Bran Oil cases, the Chino-form adverse drug reaction cases,
and the Chloroquine drug side-effect cases. In each case, a substantial
number of people suffered serious injuries. In each of the fourteen cases
related to these accidents litigated between 1977 and 1987, plaintiffs won
and the total damage award ranged from 220 million yen ($922,547; $1 =
Y238.47 in 198570) to 12 billion yen ($57,039,643; $1 = Y210.38 in
1978).71
In Type I injury cases, the Japanese courts often have been able to
impose liability on the government due to a breach of duty to inspect prod-
ucts and ensure their safety, because Japanese law does not recognize the
concept of sovereign immunity.72 As the recipient of such incentive sig-
nals, the government is more likely to develop regulatory schemes to
reduce Type I risks. Japan's extensive government intervention by means of
regulation may stem partly from the effect of these incentive signals. 73
Incentives for the government to make the cost of safety less expensive,
68. Some commentators assert that the information concerning the liability crisis
and litigation explosion is not actually supported by evidence. Saks, supra note 11, at
1156-59.
69. According to a survey conducted for corporate representatives at product safety
conferences, a majority of these representatives believe that they would be a target of
plaintiff attorneys and the subject of large jury awards if Type II accidents occurred. See
infra notes 106, 160 and accompanying text. See Appendix II, survey 2.
70. Information regarding the exchange rates between the U.S. dollar and the Japa-
nese yen is based on: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve
Bulletin, April, 1995, at A66, for the 1992-94 rates; U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1992, at 850, for the rates between 1980 and 1991; Statisti-
cal Abstract of the United States: 1980, at 927, for the rates between 1973 and 1979;
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1975, at 863, for the rates between 1970 and
1972.
71. YASUDA RESEARCH INSTusura, supra note 19, at 414-60.
72. According to Article 1 of the Government Compensation Law, when any public
servant or public entity exercises the public authority and wrongfully causes damages to
another person associated with its duty intentionally or negligently, the government or
the public entity is liable for the damages. Yukihiro Asami, Product Liability in Japan,
JAPAN Bus. L. LErr 10 (July 1989).
73. The role of the Japanese government will be examined in Part III.B.1.
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however, are not as strong as manufacturers' because governmental
resources stem from taxes rather than from sales.
Also, where the government shares liability with risk-creating manu-
facturers, incentive signals sent by courts do not have the same impact on
Type I risk-creating manufacturers as those sent by American courts. By
sharing liability with the government in Type I injury cases, Type I risk-
creating manufacturers receive fewer incentive signals to the extent the
courts apportion some of the liability to the government. Some courts have
apportioned government liability from 33% to as high as 60%.74 Among
the fourteen cases related to major Type I injury cases described earlier, the
courts assigned government liability in eleven of them.75 When the govern-
ment is held liable to these degrees, the effectiveness of incentive signals
sent from courts to manufacturers is diminished.
Moreover, these court decisions do not substantially encourage future
victims to use the judicial system as a means of recovering accident costs.
The average damage award for individual plaintiffs is far below a million
dollars, even in cases involving serious or fatal injuries. In the Chino-form
adverse drug reaction cases, where more than 11,000 people suffered seri-
ous drug side effects to their nervous systems, the average damage award
per victim ranged from 16,510,000 yen ($78,477; $1 =Y210.38 in 1978) to
29,960,000 yen ($136,791; $1 = Y219.02 in 1979).76
In addition, Japanese courts have never imposed punitive damages on
any risk-creating party. In contrast to the American judicial system, Japa-
nese courts have kept civil liability from including any punitive function
component. For example, in the Chloroquine cases, a pharmaceutical com-
pany sold medicines which caused blindness in a number of users. The
plaintiffs argued that the court should impose punitive damages on the
company because the company, in the pursuit of its profits, had deceived
users about the medicine's effects.77 The court, however, refused to im-
pose punitive damages on the manufacturer because "including a 'punitive'
mechanism in civil liability is against the fundamental policy of the Japa-
nese damage system, which pursues the fair allocation of damages (the
actual costs of accidents), and is not acceptable under the Japanese judicial
system, where the functions of civil law are dearly distinguished from
those of criminal law."78
In the Chloroquine cases, as in other product liability cases in Japan,
the courts did not explicitly consider incentive-creating functions of the
civil liability system. Indeed, they have been reluctant to utilize civil liabil-
74. David Cohen & Karen Martin, Western Ideology, Japanese Product Safety Regula-
tion and International Trade, 19 U.B.C. L. Rev. 315, 328-29 (1985).
75. See generally YASUDA REsEARcH INsrrrE, supra note 19.
76. Amo TAKEUCHI, WAGAKUNINI NO SEIZOBUTSU SEIUNIN Ho-GENjYO TO RIPPORON
[JAPANESE PRODUCT LIABILY LAw--THE ACTUAL SITUATION AND POSSIBLE LEGISLATION] 21-
23 (1990).
77. Yoshio Nakai, Chloroquine Yakugai Hanketsu ni oheru Songai-ron [The Damage
Theory in the Judgment of the Chloroquine Defective Drug Case], 1045 HANJi 3, 6 (1982).
78. Id.
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ity as a deterrent to manufacturers' risk-creating behavior. These court
decisions have discouraged victims from using the judicial system.
The courts' failure to send effective incentive signals is more serious in
Type I injury cases. The courts are less likely to hold Type II risk-creating
manufacturers liable, and damage awards do not have a significant impact
on the manufacturers even if they are held liable. For example, among
eighteen automobile-related Type II injury cases decided between 1971 and
1989 where the malfunction or defective condition of cars was at issue, the
courts imposed liability on the car manufacturer in only one case, 79 on a
component manufacturer in one case,80 and on car dealers or car inspec-
tion/repair businesses in seven cases.81 Where the manufacturer was
found liable, it paid 1,103,221 yen ($3,718; $1 = Y296.78 in 1975) in dam-
ages.8 2 Even the highest damage award imposed on a car dealer was less
than fifteen million yen ($67,987; $1 = ¥220.63 in 1981). Thus, low dam-
age awards and few cases where plaintiffs were successful indicate how
difficult it is for the judicial system to send incentive signals to Type 11 risk-
creating manufacturers.
Furthermore, the commonly accepted notion that Japanese society is
non-litigious may make manufacturers less concerned about potential civil
liability. Although some American scholars doubt the credibility of this
social norm,8 3 Japanese manufacturers believe that the chances of being
sued are slim, and this may prevent them from receiving judicially-sent
incentive signals. A 1987 Japanese survey showed that only 12% of Japa-
nese manufacturers had experienced a product liability suit,84 while 85%
of American manufacturers responded that they had experienced a prod-
uct liability suit (the PSP survey).8 5 (See Graph I) Since most Japanese
manufacturers have never experienced product liability litigation, it is diffi-
cult for them to actually anticipate litigation as one of the consequences of
product-related accidents.8 6 This is especially true in Type II injury cases;
even though a court may hold a Type 11 risk-creating manufacturer liable,
the court decision will have less impact on potential risk-creating manufac-
turers because they tend to consider the potential litigation unusual.
79. See infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
80. In this case, the seller of the car was also held liable. MASAHISA YAMAGUCHI Er AL.,
JIDOSHAJIKO NO SONGAI BAISHO To HoxEN [COMPENSATION FOR CAR AcDrNrs AND INSUR-
ANcE] 51 (1991).
81. Id. at 46-51.
82. See infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
83. John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANEsE STUDIES 359
(1978). See also Galanter, Beyond Litigation Panic, supra note 11, at 27, 28.
84. YKE1%m KIAcu-CHO KOKUMIN SEIKATSU-KYOKU, SHOHISHA GYOSEI DAIICHI-KA [CON-
SuMER ADMINSTRATION OFFICE OF THE SOCIAL POLICY DIVIsION IN THE ECONOMIC PLANNING
AGENCY], SEIZOBUrSU SEKININ WO MEGURU SAIN NO UGOKI [THE REcENTr TREND REGARD.
ING PRODUCT LIADIUnY] 50 (1987).
85. Supra note 20, Appendix .
86. See Table I and supra notes 20-22.
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1. Lawyers in the United States
In order for judicial systems to create signals, victims of product-related
injuries must first bring lawsuits against manufacturers. Because the vic-
tims usually need lawyers to bring lawsuits, the accessibility of counsel is a
key factor in the creation of signals by the judicial system.
In the United States, the large number of lawyers provides potential
victims ready access to counsel. The American Bar Association (ABA) esti-
mates that approximately 850,000 lawyers practice in the United States.8 7
The United States has one lawyer for every 356 people, while Japan has one
lawyer for every 8,569.88 In 1982, nearly 45% of American law firms'
receipts were from individuals and the absolute volume of legal services
purchased by individuals steadily rose from 1967 to 1982.89 One-third of
American lawyers are solo practitioners, who tend to represent plaintiffs in
product liability cases.90 The Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(ATLA) has nearly 60,000 members, 9 1 which is approximately four times
87. David E. Sanger, Japanese Say They Plan to Relax Restrictions on Foreign Lawyers,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 21, 1993, at Al, A9. There are roughly 14,000 lawyers in Japan. Id.
The Japanese population is half that of the United States. JETRO, U.S. and Japan in
Figures 110 (1991).
88. KEIam KcmAxu-cHo KoKuMiN SmurTsu-K Ou [SociAl. Poucy DIVIsION: EcONOMIC
PLANNING AGENCY], OshO NO SEIZOBUTSU SEKININ SEIDO NI TsurrE [PRODUTc LiABInIT SYs-
TEm IN EutoPENu CouNTmFs] 74-75 (1992). National populations per lawyer in Euro-
pean countries are: Germany-819, France-1944, Italy-1152. Id.
89. Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers?
Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 L. Soc. INQUIRY 431, 441 (1989).
90. Id. at 442.
91. Robert J. Samuelson, The Litigation Explosion: The Wrong Question, 46 MD. L.
REV. 78, 80 (1986).
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the total number of Japanese lawyers. 9 2 Thus, compared with Japanese
people, Americans have a greater access to attorneys when product-related
injuries occur.
More importantly, competition to attract potential clients among a
large number of attorneys encourages intense marketing activities and spe-
cialization. In the United States, lawyer advertising alerts actual and poten-
tial victims to the possibility of litigation and reduces their search costs in
finding counsel.9 3
Although greater accessibility to plaintiff counsel in the United States
generally increases the chances for the judicial system to create signals for
all types of product risks, not all claims brought to attorneys become filed
cases. Whether the American judicial system actually has a chance to cre-
ate signals depends on attorneys' decisions to accept cases. 9 4 Attorneys
"filter" cases based on the "margin between the cost of litigating the case
(the value of the attorney's time and the opportunity cost of taking the
case) and the expected fee from the case." 95
In the United States, most trial lawyers are paid on a contingency
basis. Under a contingent fee agreement, a lawyer who wins his or her case
gets a portion of the award, typically 30%. If the lawyer loses and damages
are not awarded, the lawyer gets nothing. Therefore, contingent fee agree-
ments make trial lawyers very sensitive to case selection. A typical attor-
ney's evaluation of whether to take a case has been stated as follows:
If the projected cost to a lawyer of litigating a case to a judgment is X dollars,
in order for the attorney to break even, the expected award or settlement,
discounted by the probability of success at trial, must be three times X (3X),
if the lawyer's fee is one third of the award. The attorney will then add to
that 3X the profit margin he requires. Injuries below this final amount are,
therefore, unlikely to become litigated cases. 96
Because the costs of litigation, including the attorney's time, are relatively
high, trial lawyers are not willing to accept cases unless they expect high
damage awards.
As a result, trial lawyers are most likely to accept Type I injury cases.
Greater severity of injury and higher probability of occurrence may
increase the expected damage award. 9 7 Even if a Type I injury case is com-
plicated, requiring more resources to litigate due to the preparation of com-
plex evidence, litigation-related costs decrease as more cases involving the
92. Sanger, supra note 87.
93. JohnJ. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 1003 (1991).
94. According to the Civil Litigation Research Project's 1983 report, half of the com-
plaints brought to a lawyer were actually filed. Saks, supra note 11, at 1190 (citation
omitted).
95. Id. at 1191. The strength of the existing evidence in a case is also an important
factor to take into consideration in the filtering process. Id.
96. Id,
97. A higher probability of accidents usually makes it easier for counsel to prove a
defendant's liability, especially when the causation or defendants' knowledge of the sim-
ilar types of accidents (or negligence in knowing the potential for accidents) is at issue.
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same type of accident are litigated. For example, after the first asbestos
cases, evidence preparation became routine, easily replicated, and the cost
of such litigation decreased. 98
In contrast, plaintiff's attorneys are less willing to accept Type II injury
cases. Even though a high severity of injury may be involved, the lower
probability of occurrence makes it more difficult for plaintiffs attorneys to
argue the cases. However, intense competition among plaintiffs attorneys
causes some to try litigating Type II injury cases. The attorney's ability to
spread the risk of taking these cases over other "strong" cases enables them
to "gamble" on winning large recoveries in Type II injury cases.99
Moreover, even if the evidence is too weak to litigate, plaintiff's attor-
neys sometimes take Type II injury cases with the expectation of profits
they might earn in settlements. If manufacturers predict that obtaining dis-
missal on the pleadings or responding to discovery requests will be very
expensive, they may prefer to settle the case regardless of their chances of
winning. 100 When manufacturers foresee a number of similar cases, they
will not jump into an "easy" settlement to protect their long-term benefits.
Because Type II injury cases are less probable, however, manufacturers are
more likely to choose quick settlements and avoid spending litigation-
related costs, 101 encouraging plaintiffs attorneys to take Type II injury
cases.
Even if manufacturers are reluctant to settle Type II injury cases, some
plaintiff attorneys are willing to try these cases merely to enhance their
reputations. Plaintiffs' attorneys gain long-term benefits by demonstrating
their enthusiasm for litigation because a reputation as an aggressive negoti-
ator tends to increase their bargaining power in future cases. 102 In con-
trast, manufacturers are less likely to act as tough negotiators in Type II
injury cases because they do not expect to deal with low probability Type II
cases often. Generally, they are more concerned about their reputation for
safety instead of their "toughness" in negotiations. Manufacturers will,
therefore, prefer to settle Type II injury cases rather than litigate when they
are concerned about the negative publicity of Type II injuries.
98. Saks, supra note 11, at 1192.
99. For an example of a plaintiff attorney's use of a "portfolio" investment approach,
see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorneys: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 669, 704-05 (1986).
100. Even a frivolous action may possess some settlement value when it is more
costly for a defendant to litigate than it is for a plaintiff. Id. at 701 (citing Rosenberg &
Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 lIrr'L Ray. L &
EcON. 3, 4-5, 9-10 (1985)).
101. Coffee points out that defendants would prefer not to settle if: 1) they believe
that the settlement would only expose them to future litigation; 2) they see reputational
injuries; 3) they expect that their litigation expenses would be fully indemnified by the
company; and 4) their insurance companies resist the settlement (because the insurance
company is a "repeat player"). Coffee, supra note 99, at 702.
102. Id. at 712-14. Coffee also mentions that litigation victories may significantly
enhance the rank and seniority of plaintiff's lawyers in the plaintiff's bar, allowing them
to obtain a more advantageous position when they work with other plaintiff's attorneys.
Id.
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The PSP survey showed the willingness of plaintiff's attorneys to deal
with product-related injury cases.10 3 In the survey, 85% of manufacturers
responded that they had received complaints from users of their product
involving either personal injuries or property damages during the previous
year.10 4 Among the companies that received complaints regarding their
products, 57% said that lawyers contacted them about the accidents.' 0 5
(See Graph II)
Graph II
Persons Who Contacted a Company Regarding a
Product-Related Accident






Lawyer User Other N/A
Number of responding manufacturers: 107
As a result, manufacturers strongly believe that trial attorneys are will-
ing to try cases related to Type II injuries. According to a survey conducted
for American manufacturers regarding their impression of the American
judicial system, roughly 90% believed that trial lawyers would try to bring
a lawsuit against them if their products caused Type II accidents, regard-
less of the kind of defect (manufacturing defect, design defect or warning
defect) the plaintiffs claim was based on. 106 (See Graph 111) These manu-
facturers' beliefs regarding trial lawyers would make them more concerned
about Type II risk reduction.
103. Supra note 20, Appendix I.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. This survey was conducted by the author for 39 American manufacturers partici-
pating in The Roles of Warnings and Instructions Program, in Madison, WI (Sept. 15-17,
1993). See Appendix II, survey 2.
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Graph III
Manufacturer's Impressions of Trial Lawyers
Q. If your product causes serious injuries in an accident, trial lawyers
will try to bring a lawsuit against your company, even though the
probability of such an accident is low.
. Manufacturing Defect ________i_ El Strongly Agree
.M_ EAgree
Design Defect El Disagree
Warning Defect UV ; Strongly Disagree
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Number of responding manufacturers - 39
2. Lawyers in Japan
Victims of product-related accidents in Japan have restricted access to legal
service because of the small number (approximately 14,000) of attorneys
in Japan.107 Although 38,000 students graduate from Japanese law facul-
ties every year, most law graduates go into business and do not obtain an
attorney's license. 108 Even though some law graduates may do legal work
in companies or the government, they cannot represent clients in a court-
room without a license. Therefore, the number of possible attorneys who
can act as plaintiff's counsel in product liability cases is quite limited.
Furthermore, the way legal services are marketed inJapan discourages
victims from contacting attorneys. Although initial consultation fees in the
United States are often free because of the intense competition among
attorneys, consultation fees in Japan are at least 5,000 yen ($49; $1 =
Y102.18 in 1994) for the first thirty minutes.10 9 Also, in Japan, attorneys
usually do not specialize in areas like personal injury, and lawyer advertis-
ing is prohibited. Thus, compared with their American counterparts, Japa-
nese victims spend more resources finding counsel suitable for their
product liability cases.
In Type I injury cases, victims, as a group, are able to use more
resources than victims of other types of injuries in order to seek legal serv-
ices. It is likely that someone in the group would know an attorney who
could represent them.110 Moreover, since Type I injury cases tend to
107. Sanger, supra note 87.
108. Galanter, Beyond the Litigation Panic, supra note 11, at 28.
109. NIH-ON BENGosli RENGOKAI CHO SAsHIrrsu [JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR AssoCIATIONS
INVESTIGATION OmcE], BENGOSHI HOsHu Krrn Commmi-ARY [ATtoRNEY'S FEE RULE Com-
mENrrARY] 73 (1988). For recent changes in the attorney's fee rules, see Junko Sumida,
Bengoshi HOshd -kitei no kaisel [Change in Attorney's Fee Rules], NIKKEI SHINBUN, Feb. 26,
1996, at 39.
110. For example, in one of the Kanemi mass-tort cases, the lawyer who took the case
was an old friend of one of the victims. Michael R. Reich, Public And Private Response To
A Chemical Disaster In Japan: The Case Of Kanemi Yusho, 15 LAw IN JAPAN 102, 113
(1982).
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attract public attention, the chance that some public-minded attorneys will
help victims is high."1 In Type II injury cases, however, victims tend to be
isolated, and their resources to obtain legal services are usually limited.
Furthermore, it is not usual for attorneys to bring lawsuits on behalf of the
victims in Type II injury cases because these cases are rarely successful. A
recent survey shows that only thirty of 250 defective product-related cases
in which Japanese lawyers were consulted were eventually filed, 112 while
American attorneys were reported to have filed half of the cases for which
they were consulted.113
The attorney fee system in Japan also discourages victims of product-
related accidents from using the judicial system to seek remedies. Attorney
fees in Japan consist of a retainer fee and a contingent fee, both of which
are determined in proportion to anticipated damage awards. Victims of
product-related accidents in Japan, therefore, must spend more on fees as
the value of their potential damage awards increase. For example, a plain-
tiff has to pay $30,000 as a retainer fee if he or she wants to bring a lawsuit
for a million dollars in damages. 114 Filing fees are also determined in pro-
portion to the anticipated damages. In Japan, if a victim files a lawsuit
claiming one hundred million yen ($978,665; $1 = Y102.18 in 1994) in
damages, the victim must pay Y417,600 ($4,087) as a filing fee, 115 whereas
in Wisconsin State courts a victim must pay $98116 and in U.S. district
courts $120.117
These fee systems discourage victims from seeking the higher damage
awards created by Type I and Type II risks. Because victims in Type II
injury cases normally lack sufficient resources compared to a group of vic-
tims in Type I injury cases, they are unlikely to use the judicial system to
seek compensation. Thus, the judicial system loses a chance to create
incentive signals targeting Type II risks.
C. Law and Legal Theories
Once victims of product-related accidents bring lawsuits, the courts create
signals through their rulings. The legal theories on which the courts base
111. In the Kanemi cases, a group of activist lawyers promoted litigation and played
an important role in fashioning remedies for the victims. Id. at 114.
112. According to the survey, 54 cases were settled but no action was taken in 166
cases. HARuo Krrmuma, PL Ho wo Ko KANGCAEGo-PL Ho WA SEKi.A NO JOSHIK1 [How To
THINK ABOUT PRODUCT LIABILITY-PRODUCT LIABILrrY IS THE WORLD'S COMMON SENsE] 84
(1992).
113. Saks, supra note 11, at 1190.
114. For a description of the Japanese attorney fee system, see generally NuiON
BENcosHm RENGOKa CHO sAsHrrsu, supra note 109. See also Sumida, supra note 109.
115. Mikio Akiyama, Sosho HiyO Seido tO no GOrika [Rationalization of Litigation Fee
System], 1028 JumusT 132, 133 (1993). Until the civil procedure law was amended in
1992, this figure was 17.7% higher. Id.
116. Interview with Staff Member, Civil-Family Office of Dane County Courts, in
Madison, WI (Dec. 6, 1993).
117. Interview with Staff Member, Clerk Of Court's Office of U.S. District Court, in
Madison, WI (Dec. 6, 1993).
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these rulings are important in determining what type of product risks will
be targeted by incentive signals from judicial systems.
1. Legal Theories in the United States
Generally, American courts use tort law in product liability cases. 118
Under tort law, courts use two theories: negligence and strict liability.
While negligence theory focuses on the due care exercised by manufactur-
ers, strict liability theory focuses on products' dangerous features. Under
strict liability theory, if manufacturers place defective products in the
"stream of commerce," they may be liable for damage caused by such prod-
ucts regardless of the degree of care exercised. 119 In applying negligence
and strict liability theories to design and warning defect cases, American
courts have based determinations of liability by balancing several factors
regarding potential accidents and defendant behavior.
Judge Learned Hand described factors for use determining the legal
standards of due care as follows:
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of
three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with
the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest
which he must sacrifice to avoid the risk.120
As to determining a manufacturer's liability in a design defect case, a fed-
eral district court characterized the formula as follows:
First, you should consider the likelihood that the product as thus designed will
result in injury to a user .... The second factor you should consider in the
unreasonably dangerous formula is the seriousness of potential injury in such
circumstances .... Third, you should consider the ability of the manufacturer
... to eliminate any unsafe characteristics... without impairing the useful-
ness ... or significantly increasing [the product's] cost .... 121
A California court considered the following factors in determining whether
a safety warning was necessary:
118. Warranty law may also be a basis of product liability. In applying warranty law
to product liability cases, many jurisdictions remove privity requirements either by
developing common law or adopting the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 2-
318 (1977). Therefore, if products do not serve their ordinary/particular purpose and
cause damages, the victims can seek recovery directly from manufacturers regardless of
the type of product risk involved. Id. However, the scope of product risk targeted by
warranty law is more limited than that targeted by tort law because some products can
satisfy the ordinary/particular purpose test but also have dangerous features. Id.
119. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
120. Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (emphasis added).
121. Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 243-44 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(emphasis added). This approach is based on the risk/utility test. Another approach to
determining a defect of a product is the consumer expectation test. Under this test, a
product may be found defective if "the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner."
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1976). Proving a defect
based on this test is usually more difficult than the risk/utility test, "because [in] many
situations ... [a] consumer would not know what to expect, because he would have no
idea how safe the product could be made." Id. (citation omitted).
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[1] the normal expectations of the consumers as to how the product will
perform, [2] degrees of simplicity or complication in the operation or use of
the product, [3] the nature and magnitude of the danger to which the user is
exposed, [4] the likelihood of injury, and [5] the feasibility and beneficial effect
of including a warning.12 2
If potential injuries measured by the severity of such injuries and the
probability of the occurrence exceed reducing costs under the formula,
courts are more likely to hold manufacturers liable for damages.
This approach helps courts impose liability on manufacturers causing
Type I injuries. Since the severity of injuries and the probability of their
occurrence are significant in Type I injury cases, Type I risk-creating manu-
facturers who fail to take safety measures tend to be held liable under negli-
gence theory or strict liability theories in design and warning defect cases.
This is because a larger amount of potential loss (the loss multiplied by the
probability) demands the higher cost of taking safety measures. Even if
safety measures are not currently available, manufacturers may believe that
they can undertake cost-justifiable safety measures by using, at maximum,
resources equivalent to the amount of the potential loss. In evaluating cost-
effectiveness, manufacturers will calculate that research expenses incurred
to develop appropriate safety measures will yield profits in the long run by
reducing the high potential liability.123
Courts, however, find it more difficult to hold Type II risk-creating
manufacturers liable. This is because the lower probability reduces poten-
tial loss and, as a result, requires lower costs for safety measures. If the
potential loss does not exceed the cost of reducing product risk, courts are
less likely to impose liability on manufacturers (and will not send incentive
signals).
Under strict liability theory, however, courts are more likely to create
incentive signals. In manufacturing defect cases, the courts tend to impose
more stringent liability on manufacturers. For example, in a defective
blood case where the defendant transfused blood containing serum hepati-
tis virus, the defendant asserted that there was absolutely no means to
detect the existence of serum hepatitis virus.12 4 Nevertheless, the court
ruled that the defendant was subject to strict liability because "[t]o allow a
defense to strict liability on the ground that there is no way, either practical
or theoretical, for a defendant to ascertain the existence of impurities in his
product would be to emasculate the doctrine [of strict liability] and in a
very real sense would signal a return to a negligence theory."1 25
Even in design defect and warning defect cases, the policy considera-
tions behind strict liability theory may encourage the courts to impose lia-
bility on manufacturers causing Type II injuries as well as Type I injuries.
Basically, in an action based on strict liability theory, a plaintiff must prove
122. Persons v. Salomon North America, Inc., 265 Cal. Rptr. 773, 777 (Cal. App. 3d
1990) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
123. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
124. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 266 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Il1. 1970).
125. Id.
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that a product has a defect and that the defect creates an unreasonably dan-
gerous condition. Proving these two factors often poses a heavy burden on
victims, especially in Type II design defect cases. Considering the policies
behind strict liability, some courts have reduced a plaintiffs burden of
proof in Type II design defect cases by shifting to manufacturers the bur-
den of proving the non-existence of defects 12 6 or by easing the requirement
of proving an unreasonable danger. 127
2. Legal Theories in Japan
The Japanese judicial system is based on a civil law system. Unlike their
American counterparts, Japanese judges cannot make law. Japanese courts
can only interpret existing law until the legislature enacts new law. In
deciding product liability cases, Japanese courts have relied primarily on
tort law,12 8 which is codified in the Civil Code. Article 709 of Minp6
(Civil Code) provides the general principle, based on negligence theory, of
Japanese tort law.129 Because the legislature had not amended this provi-
sion since 1898, the Japanese courts did not have a chance to use any new
legal doctrine, such as strict liability, in product liability cases.
130
Under negligence theory, Japanese courts impose liability on manufac-
turers when they find that the manufacturers have breached the duty to
avoid foreseeable adverse consequences, 13 1 and the burden of proof for
this breach of duty is on the plaintiff. Therefore, manufacturers are held
liable only when the plaintiff proves that the manufacturers could have
foreseen potential injuries but did not take reasonable precautions. 13 2
Even without strict liability theory, however, Japanese courts some-
times reduce a plaintiffs burden of proof by utilizing "the presumption of
negligence," or by requiring a higher degree of due care. In one of the PCB-
contaminated Kanemi Rice-Bran Oil cases, which were Type I manufactur-
126. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc.,, 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1976).
127. Cronin v.J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972).
128. Japanese courts use warranty law as well, although less often than tort law in
product liability cases. Under warranty law, manufacturers are liable if their products
do not serve their ordinary or particular purposes. Ma, po (Cr CODE), Law No. 89 of
1896, art. 415. In order to hold manufacturers liable, Japanese courts strictly require
victims to show a contractual relationship (privity) with the defendants. YASUDA
RE EARCH Ibs-rumr, supra note 19, at 339. This privity requirement often bars victims
from recovering in product liability cases because consumers usually do not have a
direct contractual relationship with manufacturers. Id. In only one case, involing con-
taminated food, a Japanese court loosely interpreted the privity requirement in favor of
the victims. Judgment of Dec. 27, 1973, Gifu Chisai, Ogaki Shibu [Gifu District Court,
Shibu Division], 725 HANji 19, reviewed by YASUDA REsEARcH INsrTruTE, supra note 19, at
339.
129. Mmu'o (CrVl CODE), Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 709. ForJapanese laws applicable
in product liability cases, see generally Asami, supra note 72.
130. On June 22, 1994, the Japanese Parliament enacted the Product Liability Law,
which introduced strict liability into Japanese tort law in product liability cases. See PL
Ha ga seiretsu, supra note 3.
131. Judgment of Aug. 3, 1978, Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo District Court], 899 HAmI 289
(1978) (Japan), reviewed by YASUDA RESEARCH INsTIrruT, supra note 19, at 336.
132. YASUDA RESEARCH INsrrruTE, supra note 19, at 336.
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ing defect cases, the courts held that food manufacturers would be pre-
sumed liable ifi (1) a defect harmful to human life or health existed in the
food; (2) the defect was created before the food was sent into the market-
place; (3) a person who consumed the foods died or was seriously injured;
and (4) the food manufacturers could not prove that they had been unable
to foresee the occurrence of such a defect in the exercise of a high standard
of care required of all food manufacturers.1 33 In one of the Chino-form
adverse drug reaction cases, which were Type I design defect cases, the
court held pharmaceutical manufacturers to a higher standard of care,
including: the duty to continuously confirm the utility and safety of
medicines through foreign and domestic research and clinical experimen-
tation; the duty to stop manufacturing and marketing medicines when they
are found to have serious side effects; and the duty to warn users of poten-
tial adverse effects when the utility of the products outweighed the poten-
tial adverse effects. 134
Although these approaches bring negligence-based liability closer to
strict liability, Japanese courts tend to take these quasi-strict liability
approaches only in Type I injury cases, where food and pharmaceutical
manufacturers, for example, cause Type I injuries. The courts have
imposed a high standard of care on these Type I risk-creating manufactur-
ers, but they have not imposed the same standard on manufacturers of
other kinds of products.
In addition, stringent causation requirements have placed a heavy bur-
den, especially on Type II injury victims, where the low probability of inju-
ries usually makes it more difficult to prove causation. This is partly due
to the scope of discovery under Japanese procedural law, which is much
more limited than under the American discovery system. Japanese courts
allow only limited disclosure of documents and rely heavily on oral argu-
ment at trial.135 Therefore, in complicated cases, even victims of Type I
injuries bear a heavy burden of proving the causal link between products
and their injuries. For example, Showa Denko, a Japanese manufacturer,
marketed a sleeping tablet, L-Trypton, in the American market as well as
133. Judgment of Oct. 5, 1977, Fukuoka Chisai [Fukuoka District Court], 866 HAJI
56 (1977) (Japan), reviewed by YAsIDA RESEARCH INsrrrUE, supra note 19, at 337.
134. Judgment of Mar. 11, 1988, Tokyo Kosai [Court of Appeal in Tokyo], 1271 HAji
400 (1988) (Japan), reviewed by YASUDA RESEARCH INTsTrrrTU, supra note 19, at 337.
135. Koji Harada, Civil Discovery Under Japanese Law, 16 LAw iN JAPAN 21, 32-39(1983). Harada described the difference between civil procedure systems in Japan and
the United States as follows:
With respect to the pretrial process, civil procedure in the United States can be
characterized as a war with weapons, and Japanese civil procedure as a bare
knuckles fight. In Japan, formal oral arguments, comparable to the exchange of
letters between shy lovers, are repeated in court to specify the alleged negligence
without the parties having any effective means of obtaining information about
the particulars of the negligence. On the other hand, the American system,
while it works very effectively, costs a great deal, takes time, and is subject to
abuse.
o
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the Japanese market.136 Tablet users started suffering muscular pain and
dizziness. In 1990, the United States Food and Drug Administration dis-
covered more than 1,500 victims of the L-Trypton syndrome and thirty-one
deaths caused by the syndrone. 137 More than 1,000 lawsuits have been
filed against Showa Denko, and the company paid 12.3 billion yen
($9,701,846; $1 = Y126.78 in 1992) in the first half of 1992 to settle the
claims. 138 In Japan, however, there is no case associated with the L-
Trypton syndrome. One Japanese victim said that it was difficult to litigate
because of the restrictive discovery system.139
To reduce the burden of proof on plaintiffs, Japanese courts have
allowed plaintiffs to use epidemiological information in Type I injury
cases.140 Nevertheless, epidemiological studies of product-related acci-
dents are possible only when a large number of people suffer the same
kind of injury from the same kind of product, usually a Type I injury. In
cases involving isolated injuries, such as Type II injury cases, victims are
discouraged from bringing a legal action because they must prove specific
causation. 141
D. The Decision Makers
When a judge or a jury determines liability and awards damages based on
applicable legal theories, judicial systems can send signals to risk-creating
manufacturers. Juries have played a very important role in product liability
cases in the United States, even though, in the current discussion of tort
reform, business advocates criticize their performance and abilities in
product liability cases. The criticism includes the "uncertainty" created by
"unusually large and unpredictable jury awards." 142 Japan, in contrast,
has no jury system. It is exclusively the judge's role to find facts, interpret
the law, and apply it to the case.
This section analyzes how the American jury system and the Japanese
non-jury system affect the abilities of their respective judicial systems to
create incentive signals. This section focuses on their different abilities to
determine liability and damage awards as well as the impact on Type II
risk-creating manufacturers.
Id. at 32.
136. Yuko Inoue, Controversy highlights in debate over product liability law: Industry




140. Judgment of Mar. 1, 1978, Kanazawa Chisai [Kanzawa District Court], 879 HANIji
26 (1978) (Japan), reviewed by YAsuDA PasEARcH INsrrrur, supra note 19, at 336. See
also Judgment of Aug. 3, 1978, Tokyo Chisai, 899 HANJI 48 (1978) (Japan), reviewed by
YASUDA RESACH INsurr , supra note 19, at 336.
141. Cohen & Martin, supra note 74, at 331. But see Hideyuki Kobayashi, Matsushita
Denhi Kara Terebi Kasai Jiken [A Case Involving a Fire Caused by a Color TV Made by
Matsushita Electric], 165 HOGaxu KYosnrrsu 113 (1994), for a recent court ruling that
reduced a victim's burden of proof in a non-Type I injury case.
142. Product Liability Reform Act, supra note 13, at 44.
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1. The American Jury and Product Liability Cases
a. Liability determination
Decision makers in a judicial system need to hold liable risk-creating man-
ufacturers in order for a judicial system to create incentive signals targeting
such manufacturers. In the United States, the role of juries in determining
liability has significantly influenced the creation of incentive signals.
In his 1964 article, Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., showed that judges
and juries agreed on the issue of liability in 79% of all personal injury
cases. 143 The study further showed that judges disagreed with juries in
11% of the cases because the juries were more pro-plaintiff, while juries
disagreed with judges in 10% of the cases because the judges were more
pro-plaintiff. 144 In this study, the difference in liability determinations
between judges and juries was not substantial.
Cases where a judge disagreed with a jury because the jury was more
pro-plaintiff, however, can constitute a key factor in affecting the American
judicial system's ability to create incentive signals targeting Type II risks,
especially if the reason for disagreement is based on jurors' sympathy for
the victims. The balancing aspects of negligence theory and strict liability
theory in the design and warning defect cases in the United States may
pose a bar to the recovery of damages by victims of Type II risks if the
possibility of injury occurrence is minimal. Nevertheless, if jurors focus
more on the severity of a victim's injury rather than on the probability of
accident occurrence, their sympathetic decision making can help produce
incentive signals to target Type II risk-creating manufacturers.
In an interview with a camping burner manufacturer, the manufac-
turer stated that his company always lost their product liability cases
(which usually involved severe burns) because the jury, after seeing heart-
breaking pictures of burns, seemed to think that somebody should pay
damages even though product design could not have prevented the
injury.145 In a Washington case, in which an infant who drank baby oil
suffered serious brain damage, the jury held the manufacturer liable for
failure to warn against the risk of a child aspirating, although the manufac-
turer contended that such a risk was "extremely low" and therefore did not
require a manufacturer's warning.14 6 The American jury system may also
aid victims of Type II manufacturing defect cases, in which causation is
usually difficult to prove because of the low probability. In a car accident
case, where the driver suffered severe brain damage and later died, the jury
entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff although all of the plaintiffs evi-
143. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1065 (1964).
144. Id.
145. Interview with Participant at The Roles of Warnings and Instructions Program in
Madison, WI (Sept. 15-17, 1993).
146. Ayers v.Johnson &Johnson Baby Prod. Co., 818 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Wash. 1991).
Although the Washington Court of Appeals and the Washington Supreme Court ruled in
favor of the plaintiff, the trial court granted defendant's motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict on the grounds that the evidence failed to establish proximate cau-
sation or foreseeability of harm. Id. at 1339-40.
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dence was circumstantial and the defendant car manufacturer rebutted
every possibility that any manufacturer-related defect had caused the
accident.147
These types of cases tend to elicit jurors' natural sympathy for a seri-
ously injured person.' 48 This jury attitude is especially true when a
defendant is a manufacturing company.149 A survey conducted by the
RAND Corporation confirmed the pro-plaintiff attitude of juries when
defendants were corporations and plaintiffs suffered severe injuries.' 50 In
jury trials, corporate defendants lost 53% of cases where plaintiffs suffered
severe injuries on the defendants' property, while losing 48% of similar
cases when plaintiffs did not suffer severe injuries.' 5 ' In contrast, when
defendants were individuals, the greater severity of a plaintiffs injuries did
not increase his or her chances of winning.'5 2
Even though it may be atypical in the United States for juries to find
corporate defendants liable due solely to a severly injured plaintiff, such
pro-plaintiff decisions have a great impact on manufacturers because the
outcomes of these cases tend to be reported more frequently and draw
more public attention. Media and political propaganda provided by tort
reform supporters play an important role in increasing public awareness of
these cases. As a result, the fear of a pro-plaintiff jury leads manufacturers
to pay more attention to their safety strategies targeting Type 11 risks.
b. Damage determination
To create incentive signals, decision makers must not only hold risk-creat-
ing manufacturers liable but also impose liability stringent enough to con-
vince the manufacturers that liability and litigation-associated costs will be
more expensive than the cost of reducing risks. The prospect of high dam-
age awards makes investment in safety measures economically rational for
manufacturers. Therefore, the willingness of decision makers to impose
larger damage awards is a key factor in the creation of effective incentive
signals.
Some studies indicate that juries tend to award higher damages than
judges. In his study, Professor Kalven showed that jury awards were, on
average, 20% higher than judges' awards in personal injury cases.' 53 In
147. Siegelv. Mazda Motor Corp., 835 F.2d 1475, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The defend-
ant criticized the decision, stating that "accident plus injury, without more, equals recov-
ery." Id.
148. David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. Cut. L. REv. 1, 11 (1982).
149. Id. Owen attributed this jury attitude to general hostility toward "big business."
Id.
150. AuDREY CIN & MARc A. PErERSON, DEEP PocKErs, EMPTY PocKErs-WHo Wuns iN
CooK COUNTY JURY TRLAs 42 (1985). The survey information is based on federal and
state jury trials held in Cook County between 1960 and 1979.
151. Id.
152. Id. When defendants were individuals, they lost 43% of the cases against plain-
tiffs suffering severe injuries and 47% of the cases against plaintiffs not severely injured.
Id.
153. Kalven, supra note 143, at 1065.
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addition, amounts increased when defendants were corporations and
plaintiffs injuries were severe. According to a RAND Corporation survey,
in jury trials corporate defendants paid 30% more than individual defend-
ants when plaintiffs were not severely injured, and 50% more when plain-
tiffs suffered severe injuries.154
Even though juries impose large liability damages on manufacturers,
the manufacturers may choose to risk potential liability, especially when
the current costs of safety measures for total units exceed the costs of
potential Type II injuries. Manufacturers can allow accidents to happen,
pay damages to the victims, and transfer the compensation costs to the
product's price. Strict liability theory in the United States premised this
risk allocation scenario: "the risk of injury can be insured by the manufac-
turer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. 1 55
Nevertheless, manufacturers' decisions will be different when juries
regard such a risk management policy as a "reckless" disregard or indiffer-
ence to human life and, therefore, impose punitive damages or increase
pain and suffering damages.156 In several Type II design defect cases
where the lack of safety measures created severe injuries and the safety
measure's cost per unit was inexpensive, juries awarded large damage
awards to victims. 15 7 A plaintiffs attorney admitted that trial lawyers tried
to emphasize how inexpensive a feasible safety measure per unit was in
order to appeal to the jury's sympathy.' 58 If these arguments induce larger
damage awards regardless of any rational balancing between the current
costs for total units of safety measures and the costs of potential accidental
injuries, manufacturers are more likely to take safety measures against
Type II risks and, at the same time, spend more on finding less expensive
safety measures.
More importantly, the media tend to report large jury awards and
some political groups emphasize particular "unusually large" jury awards,
154. CHIN & PErERSON, supra note 150, at 43.
155. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
156. For a discussion of the liability test of punitive damages, see generally Owen,
supra note 148.
157. A well-known example of this type of case is the Grimshaw case. Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 1981). In this case, a California
Court of Appeals affirmed a jury award of $2.5 million in compensatory damages and
$123 million in punitive damages to a three-year old for severe bums caused by an auto-
mobile fire. Id. at 399. This fire resulted from improper gas tank placement. Id. at 361.
Knowing of the car's gas tank defect, the car manufacturer failed to take feasible and
inexpensive safety measures, most of which cost less than $10. Id.
In a recent case, a jury returned an $11.3 million verdict against General Motors Cor-
poration (GMC) for a truck fire that killed a woman. Jury Blames General Motors In a
Fatal Truck Fire in 1990, N.Y. Tmaws, Feb. 5, 1993, at Al. The plaintiffs attorney
presented into evidence a GMC report estimating that a safety measure costing $2.20
per car could have prevented the accident. Id.
158. Comments of a trial lawyer, participating in the successful defense of a product
liability lawsuit program, in Madison, WI (Apr. 5-6, 1993).
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including "unforeseen punitive damages," 15 9 while publicizing pro-plaintiff
liability determinations by juries. As a result, American manufacturers
strongly believe that juries tend to give large damage awards even in Type II
injury cases. In a survey of American manufacturers regarding their
impression of the judicial system, 79.5 % of the respondents agreed that a
jury would give large damage awards in Type II manufacturing and warn-
ing defect cases, and 76.6% agreed on a jury's large damage award in Type
II design defect cases.160 (See Graph IV) Due to potential stringent liabil-
ity in Type II accident cases, manufacturers are encouraged to take safety
measures against Type II risks.
Graph IV
Manufacturers' Impressions of Juries
If your product causes serious injuries in an accident and your com-
pany is sued, a jury will award a large amount for damages for the
victims, even though the probability of such an accident is low.
Manufacturing Defect]| ________ I_ [ Strongly Agree0D Agree
Design Defect E Disagree
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Number of responding manufacturers - 39
2. Japanese Judges and Product Liability Cases
a. Liability determination
The Japanese judicial system is less likely to create incentive signals against
Type II risk-creating manufacturers than the American judicial system is.
Japanese judges seldom decide Type 11 injury cases in favor of plaintiffs, no
matter what types of defects are involved. Judges have attempted to lower
the plaintiffs burden of proof in some Type I injury cases,161 but they have
not made the same attempt in Type II injury cases.1 62 This may be because
the severity of the injury alone is less likely to affect the judge's decision.
In Type II design and warning defect cases, judges tend to attribute the
cause of accidents to plaintiffs' contributory negligence and misuse.' 63 In
159. Product Liability Reform Act, supra note 13, at 44. The tort reform bill currently
proposed focuses on placing a cap on punitive damages juries may award in product
liability cases. See Lewis, supra note 15. See also generally Federal Tort Reform, Confer-
ence Committee Reaches Comprise on Product Liability Bill, CCH Product Liability
Reports No. 854, at 1 (Mar. 18, 1996).
160. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. See also Appendix II, survey 2.
161. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
162. See generally YASUDA RESEARCH INsTrrE, supra note 19, at 403-66. But see
Kobayashi, supra note 141.
163. See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
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Type II manufacturing defect cases, they tend to decide that a plaintiffs
evidence is not enough to prove the defendant's negligence or causation. 16 4
These Type II injury cases include: a "baby guard" (a fence keeping a child
inside a room) case, where the baby was choked by one of the diamond
shaped spaces in a fence; 16 5 a gas heater case, where an eight year old girl
warming herself by a heater received severe bums over 30% of her body;166
and a car fire case, where small children in a car were burnt to death by a
fire occurring only five minutes after the parent parked and left the car.16 7
In the baby guard case and the gas heater case, the courts attributed the
cause of the accidents to the parents' and victims' misuse of the products
rather than to the condition of the products.16 8 In the car fire case, the
plaintiff argued that the fire had been caused by a short circuit in the car's
electric system, but the judge decided that the car manufacturer was not
liable because the possibility of such a short circuit causing a fire was
extremely Low.169
While the American jury system has helped create incentive signals
through some pro-plaintiff decisions against Type II risk-creating manufac-
turers, Japanese judges have not. In Type II injury cases where the plaintiff
suffered severe injury but had weak evidence due to low probability of
injury occurrence, Japanese judges failed to create incentive signals to Type
II risk-creating manufacturers. 170
b. Damage determination
In determining damage awards, Japanese judges have never imposed signif-
icantly higher damages on manufacturers in cases where the absence of
inexpensive safety measures caused severe injuries. This is partly because
Japan does not have a damage system which dramatically increases dam-
ages in order to punish risk-creating manufacturers for their unsafe prac-
tices, such as punitive damages in the United States. It is also due in part
to the fact that the Japanese legal system offers no way to transform the
"anger" towards a manufacturer's unsafe practices into monetary value, as
can an American jury. Japanese judges may, however, impose "apology
fees" (Isha-ry6) which are equivalent to damages for pain and suffering and
other non-economic losses.17 1 Regardless, the fundamental theory of this
non-pecuniary damage system is one of compensation rather than sanc-
tion, and the judges have not considered this non-pecuniary damage sys-
164. Id.
165. Judgment of Mar. 23, 1979, Kobe Chisai Amagasaki Shibu [Kobe District Court,
Amagasaki Division], 942 HAjii 87 (1979) (Japan).
166. Judgment of Mar. 26, 1984, Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo District Court], 1143 HANJi 105
(1985) (Japan).
167. Judgment of July 18, 1983, Tokyo Chisai [Tokyo District Court], 1099 HANI 67
(1984) (Japan).
168. Judgment of Mar. 23, 1979, 942 HAJI at 90-91; Judgment of Mar. 26, 1984,
1143 HANi at 111.
169. Judgment of July 18, 1983, 1099 1I-ANI at 80.
170. But see Kobayashi, supra note 141.
171. AKaO MORISHIMA, FuHoUKouIHou KouGI [TORT LAW LEcrUREs] 364-65 (1987).
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tern as a means for sending incentive signals to Type II risk-creating
manufacturers. 1 72
The following two representative cases, decided in courts of the
United States and Japan respectively, show the different abilities of Ameri-
can juries and Japanese judges to send incentive signals to Type II risk-
creating manufacturers through their determination of damages. The two
cases are Ferris v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., a 1991 California case1 73 and
Kamezaki v. Mitsubishi Jfik6 Co., a 1975 Yokohama District Court case.1 74
Both cases are Type II design defect cases, and the cause of the accidents in
both cases was the absence of a technologically feasible and inexpensive
safety device. Neither case involved death or permanent disability.
In the Ferris case, the plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger
on an ATV (all-terrain vehicle) made by the defendant.175 The plaintiff
alleged that the absence of a device to keep the passenger's foot away from
a rear tire caused her injury.176 She presented evidence showing that the
defendant had provided such a safety device in the past, which cost $3 to
$4 per vehicle, but had later substituted for it a safety warning stating:
"Operator Only."17 7 The plaintiff incurred medical expenses of $8,500
and lost wages of $8,500.178 The jury awarded $2,175,000 in damages,
consisting of $25,000 to compensate for economic loss, $150,000 for non-
economic damages, and $2,000,000 for punitive damages.' 79
In the Kamezaki case, the plaintiff suffered a facial injury while riding
directly behind the passenger seat in the rear seat of a two-door car.' 80
The car did not carry any device preventing the back of the passenger seat
from falling forward when no one was sitting in the passenger seat.' 8 '
When the car suddenly stopped, the plaintiff fell forward and hit his
face.' 8 2 The judge found that the back of the passenger seat should have
been built to withstand frontal and rear-end collisions in order to support
the body of a person in the rear seat and prevent his or her body from
falling forward when the car stopped suddenly.' 8 3 The judge also found
that such a stabilizing device was technologically feasible and, in fact,
some two-door cars already incorporated such a device at the time the
defendant manufactured the car.' 8 4 The judge recognized (but did not
172. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
173. Ferris v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., No. C-672437 (Los Angeles Cty. Super. Ct. Cal.
May 9, 1991), [Mar. 1992] Verdicts, Settlements & Tactics 93.
174. Judgment of Feb. 4, 1975, Yokohama Chisai [Yokohama District Court], 324
HANA 268 (1975) (Japan).
175. Ferris v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., No. C-672437 (Los Angeles Cty. Super. Ct. Cal.





180. Judgment of Feb. 4, 1975, 324 HANTA at 268-69.
181. Id. at 270.
182. Id. at 268-69.
183. Id. at 270.
184. Id.
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award) 3,716,107 yen ($12,521; $1 = Y 296.78 in 1975) in damages con-
sisting of medical fees, loss of wages and other pecuniary damages, and
1,800,000 yen ($6,065) as an apology fee. 18' The judge reduced the dam-
ages by half based on comparative negligence because the plaintiff was
leaning on the back of the passenger seat when the accident occurred. 186
He assigned 30% of the liability to the driver, who suddenly stopped the
car, and 20% to the car manufacturer for not installing the safety device.' 8 7
In addition, the judge reduced the driver's liability by 10% because the
driver gave a ride to the plaintiff out of kindness. 188
Although both the U.S. and Japanese courts imposed liability on the
manufacturers for the lack of safety devices, there is a clear difference in
the signals sent by each court and the impact each had on Type II risk-
creating manufacturers. In the Kamezaki case, the manufacturer paid
1,103,221 yen ($3,717) in damages, the equivalent of only 30% of the
pecuniary damages the victim incurred. In contrast, in the Ferris case, the
total liability damage awarded against the manufacturer was eighty-six
times greater than the actual pecuniary losses the victim incurred.
Although American appellate courts reduce or reverse damages in 52% of
cases involving punitive damages,' 89 the impact of high damage award
cases on potential risk-creating manufacturers remains effective. In con-
trast, even when Japanese judges hold manufacturers liable, they fail to
send strong incentive signals to potential risk-creating manufacturers
because of their damages determination. These cases strikingly illustrate
why the Japanese judicial system is less likely than the American judicial
system to create incentive signals targeting Type II risk-creating
manufacturers.
III. American and Japanese Political Institutions as Incentive-creating
Mechanisms
This next section analyzes incentive signals created by U.S. and Japanese
political institutions. It first examines the ability of political institutions
and their enforcement mechanisms to target Type II risks, with particular
focus on American political institutions. Secondly, this section analyzes
the characteristics of Japanese political institutions and their enforcement
mechanisms.
A. Capability of Political Institutions to Create Incentive Signals
1. Political Influences by Manufacturers and Types of Product Risks
In addition to the U.S. judicial system, U.S. political institutions have also
played an important role in creating and sending incentive signals against
various kinds of product risk Those signals have historically targeted cer-
185. Judgment of Feb. 4, 1975, 324 HArA at 271-72.
186. Id. at 272.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. RusrAD, supra note 63, at 31.
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tain kinds of products, such as food, drugs, automobiles, aircraft, and
highly flammable and explosive substances.190 Safety laws related to some
of these products are older than the development of American product lia-
bility law.191 Most of these products have, or at least used to have, Type I
risks or mass disaster-related Type II risks. In other words, incentive sig-
nals from political institutions in the United States have been successful in
targeting products that may cause Type I injuries or mass disaster-related
Type II injuries.
Although manufacturers have abundant resources to represent their
interests in the political process, their efforts are less likely to be successful
in opposing political controls on Type I risks or mass disaster-related Type
II risks. Because Type I injuries or the images of mass disaster-related Type
II injuries tend to bring about stronger public support for such political
controls, these injuries strongly encourage political bodies to create regula-
tory schemes targeting these risks.
However, the lower the probability of injuries or the less the product
risks are related to mass disaster accidents, the more difficult it is for polit-
ical institutions to create incentive signals targeting product risk The
lower probability of injuries decreases the potential impact of the injuries
on the public. Also, the media is less likely to exaggerate the impact of
Type II injuries if the injuries are not related to mass disaster accidents.
The lower probability of injuries and the remote relationship to mass disas-
ter-related injuries decrease the public sympathy for victims as well as the
interests of consumer groups, while increasing resistance by interested
manufacturers who are less likely to harm their corporate images opposing
political control over such risks. Unlike Type I risk legislation, legislation
for political control over Type II risks requires considerable efforts by
devoted professionals or groups when the legislation is not related to mass
disaster accidents. The activities of public-minded professionals in the
United States have played an important role in influencing political institu-
tions to create incentive signals targeting Type II risks. 192
2. Consumer Representatives and Type 11 Risk Legislation
Public-minded professionals and consumer groups (collectively "consumer
representatives") go through three stages when encouraging political insti-
tutions to create incentive signals, especially against Type II risks: data
gathering, public awareness enhancement, and legislative efforts. 193 At the
data gathering stage, consumer representatives need to collect enough
190. See Joseph H. Baliway, Jr., Products Liability Based Upon Violation of Statutory
Standards, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1388-89 nn.3-9 (1966).
191. Id.
192. For a discussion of professional legislative strategies for Type II risk, see PoLrr-
icAL APPROACHES TO INJURY CONTROL AT THE STATE LEVEL (Abraham B. Bergman ed.,
1992).
193. Murray L. Katcher, Efforts to Prevent Burns from Hot Tap Water, in PoLcIC
APPROACHES TO INJURY CONTROL AT THE STATE LEVEL 69, 69-78 (Abraham B. Bergman ed.,
1992) (explaining the process of Wisconsin scald bum prevention legislation in terms of
these three stages).
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information to show that the aggregate number of accidents is "signifi-
cant," even though the probability of individual cases may not be high. If
the aggregate number of accidents is not large enough to attract public
attention, there is no chance of persuading political institutions to target
Type II risks.
At the public awareness enhancement stage, consumer representatives
use various channels of communication to inform the public about Type II
risks. If they can successfully raise public awareness and the public takes
precautions, consumer representatives may be able to reduce Type II risks
without further efforts at enacting law. In. reality, however, public aware-
ness efforts do not contribute very much to Type II risk reduction. Accord-
ing to research on the effect of public awareness media campaigns
regarding Type II risks, these campaigns tend to increase public awareness
but not necessarily change behavior. 194
If specific Type II injuries are sufficiently numerous and public aware-
ness about the risk increases, consumer representatives need to make
efforts to enact Type II risk reduction legislation. This is a crucial stage in
creating incentive signals through political institutions. Any safety legisla-
tion, however, tends to be characterized as "anti-business" and, therefore,
strong resistance from the business sector (usually manufacturers' groups)
often prevents enactment. 195 Manufacturers' groups fear that, even if the
cost of safety measures is slight, they must continuously incur the cost of
additional safety measures or, at least, bear the cost of modifying some
production lines. When lobbying against proposed legislation, manufac-
turers' groups are much more active and organized than consumer repre-
sentatives whose motivation comes from the pursuit of social good rather
than fear of losing profits.196
Especially in Type II risk legislation, manufacturers' representatives
try to enlist public support by emphasizing the additional costs that con-
sumers ultimately would incur. An example of this comes from the history
of Wisconsin scald burn prevention legislation, which requires hot water
heater manufacturers to preset a heater's temperature at a safe level and to
attach safety warnings on each unit.
[W]hen the bill went to the Senate Judiciary and Commerce Affairs Commit-
tee, a national group, the Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association (GAMA),
sent a representative to oppose the bill at a public hearing. The gist of his
argument was that unfriendly actions toward the industry would result in
high water heater prices to Wisconsin consumers (as a result of the "special"
thermostat setting).19 7
Nevertheless, consumer representatives may be able to overcome the
political influence of manufacturer groups if they can successfully create
194. Id. at 72.
195. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
196. Professor Komesar attributes this overrepresentation of potential injurers (man-
ufacturers) to the significant differences in per capita impact between potential injurers
and potential victims. Komesar, supra note 26, at 41-42.
197. Katcher, supra note 193, at 74.
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public support for Type 11 risk legislation. For example, "created" public
support influenced the final stage of the Wisconsin scald burn prevention
legislation.
The Governor, believing that the hot water safety bill was anti-business, was
planning not to sign it. However, he was influenced by several of his close
friends, who were urged by advocates to call and write him. In addition,
there was a letter-writing campaign to the Governor, which resulted in more
than 100 letters pertaining to this fairly innocuous bill .... When he signed
it[,] the Governor stated that letters from many citizens and groups had
influenced his natural inclination not to sign the bill. 198
3. Comparative Analysis of Limitations of Political Signal-oriented
Approach
Creation of incentive signals through the political process depends heavily
on the strategies and tactics used by consumer representatives and manu-
facturers' groups. Although both sides make their arguments based on
accident data or cost-benefit analyses, they exploit the information to cre-
ate strong public support in their favor.
Through manipulation of the information in their favor, manufactur-
ers' groups often try to block political control over product risks.1 99 In
addition, the activities of consumer representatives can encourage political
institutions to create "misdirected" incentive signals. This misdirection by
consumer representatives is particularly common when the same types of
products possess both Type I and Type II risks. The public may fear the
Type I risks but support public representatives' work towards reducing
Type II risks. For example, asbestos has Type I risks for workers using
asbestos materials but Type II risks for people using offices or classrooms
containing asbestos materials. The threat to the public of asbestos risks,
however, pressures political bodies to remove asbestos materials from
offices or school buildings at significant costs, including the cost of the
lives of workers removing asbestos. 20 0
In contrast, the judicial system is less likely to create these kinds of
misdirected incentive signals. Although asbestos companies may lose a
few lawsuits brought by people using offices which contain asbestos mater-
ials, they lose higher numbers of lawsuits brought by workers using asbes-
tos, paying larger damage awards in the latter. Reacting to these incentive
signals, the asbestos companies may place a higher priority on protecting
these workers from asbestos exposures than on removing asbestos from
office buildings.
To avoid being influenced by manipulated information and misdi-
rected incentive signals, it may be possible for experts in government agen-
198. Id. at 75.
199. Id. at 74.
200. Peter Passell, Economic Scene, N.Y. TIwEs, Sept. 9, 1993, at D2, quoting from
STEPHEN BRmEYE, BREAKING ThE VICIOUS CmcLE 13-14 (1993) (noting that panic over
asbestos had led to a cleanup effort costing an estimated $250 million per life saved, but
that at the same time, it might actually kill dozens of asbestos-removal workers).
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cies to analyze product risks independently from manufacturers' groups
and consumer representatives. For example, in the United States, the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) establishes performance and
labeling requirements for consumer products, "when such requirements
are reasonably necessary to eliminate unreasonable risks of injury associ-
ated with that product."201 As an example of its activities, the CPSC identi-
fies "unreasonable risks" based on cost/benefit analyses. The CPSC
regarded the risk of fires caused by children playing with cigarette lighters
as unreasonable and the requirement of a child resistant device as reason-
ably necessary due to its conclusion that the requirement would save from
$210 million to $290 million a year at a cost of $95 million.20 2
This approach is similar to the balancing aspect of negligence and
strict liability in design and warning defect cases. The fundamental differ-
ence between these two balancing analyses arises from different decision
makers: government officials or juries. Although the government officials
analyze accident surveys or statistics without observing actual victims, in a
court room juries must face a victim who has suffered a severe injury.
Therefore, jury decisions tend to be "severity oriented." As discussed previ-
ously in Type II risk injury cases, the significant difference between the
current per-unit cost of a safety measure and the cost of a victim's serious
injury sometimes enables the American judicial system to send strong
incentive signals through high jury awards without serious consideration
of the total cost.20 3 Thus, the actual and potential Type II risk-creating
manufacturers are often encouraged to take safety measures and invest
more in finding less expensive alternatives when they predict high "poten-
tial costs." For example, they may anticipate extended liability damages in
future cases brought against them for not taking feasible safety measures in
spite of knowledge of product risks.
Agency analyses are, however, more "total cost" oriented. An agency's
analysis will not focus on detailed information of actual injuries and
deaths. Rather, it calculates the total losses based on a per capita "flat
cost" of human life, health, and safe environment. If an agency concludes
that total costs for implementing a safety regulation exceed potential
losses, it fails to send incentive signals to the risk-creating manufacturers.
As a result, the manufacturers will have little incentive to make the cost of
currently available safety measures inexpensive or find cost-justifiable
alternatives. For example, the report of a recent train derailment accident,
in which approximately fifty people died, revealed that a safety sensor sys-
tem was available to prevent this kind of accident.204 Fourteen years ago,
however, the Federal Railroad Administration did not adopt this system
201. 15 U.S.C. § 2053 (1994). The CPSC has jurisdiction over products except for
those subject to other laws, such as the Federal Aviation Act and Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act. Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (1994).
202. Regulation of Products Subject to Other Codes under the Consumer Product
Safety Act, 16 C.F.R. § 1145 (1995).
203. See supra notes 175-79; see also supra notes 157-58.
204. Peter Applebome, Government Rejected Sensor System On Nation's Railroad
Bridges in 1981, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 25, 1993, at 6.
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because "the projected costs far outweigh[ed] the benefits," in light of the
$850 million installation cost and the $85 million per year maintenance
cost.20 5 Since then, there has not been any effort to develop more cost-
effective ways to utilize this sensor system.
Moreover, when an agency requires certain safety measures based on
their own analyses of current accident data, the legally required safety
measures can dissuade manufacturers from inventing more effective ones.
Each safety regulation targets specific product risks with relatively con-
crete standards drafted by experts. Manufacturers targeted by these regula-
tory schemes have no incentive to exceed the standards if doing so would
involve additional costs. In contrast, incentive signals created by judicial
systems leave to manufacturers the decisions as to how and what safety
measures should be implemented. Therefore, manufacturers must develop
their own reasonable safety measures which reflect the safety requirements
required by contemporary court decisions.
Manufacturers' product safety label practices illustrate the different
consequences of these two kinds of incentive signals. Federal laws and
regulations require manufacturers to place warning labels on certain kinds
of products. 20 6 However, industry groups, reacting to a growing amount of
product liability decisions based on warning defects, have also developed
voluntary standards used by increasing numbers of manufacturers. In fact,
safety warnings based on industry standards tend to be more effective than
government warnings in communicating potential hazards to users. (See
Figure II)
Figure II
Mandatory safety warning based on federal regulations, Federal Hazardous
Substances Act. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.121 (1973):
WARNING: Do Not Use for Indoor
Heating or Cooking Unless Ventilation
is Provided for Exhausting Fumes to
Outside. Toxic Fumes May Accumulate
and Cause Death.
In comparison, below is an analogous safety warning based on industry
(non-mandatory) standards:20 7
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 16 CFR § 1500.121 (1973), in Fig-
ure II, infra.
207. This author-created warning is based on the format and rules described in
NATIONAL ELECTRICAL MANUmACURERS ASSOCIATION, AmmcN NATIONAL STANDARD:
PRODUCT SAFmY SIGNS AND LABELS (ANSI Z535.4) (1991) and uses a graphic based on
FMC CORPORATION, PRODUCT SAFrm SIGN AND LABEL SYSTEM 8-18 (1990).
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The background of








Failure to do so could
cause serious injury
or death.
A more serious drawback for incentive signals created by a govern-
ment agency is political control over its budget. Even if an agency's analy-
ses of product risk are not directly subject to outside political pressure, 20 8
its available budget may determine its ability to create incentive signals. An
agency's available resources vary depending on the government policy, not
on the number of particular product-related accidents. For instance, some
advocates criticize the CPSC for its slow and inefficient procedures. 20 9
These problems stem mainly from the CPSC's insufficient resources. Its
budget has decreased by 16% from 1979 to 1991 because of cut-backs
made during the Republican administrations. 21 0
Despite insufficient resources, the CPSC cannot limit its activities to
targeting Type I risks due to strong pressure from the public. Nevertheless,
the fewer resources available, the less attention the CPSC can pay to Type II
risks. The risk/benefit analyses for Type II risks usually require substan-
tial resources to establish effective safety standards. Given its limited
resources, therefore, the CPSC tends to delay implementation of any Type
II risk regulations. Examples of its long-term research studies of Type II
risks include fires caused by children playing with disposable cigarette
lighters and tip-over accidents of riding lawnmowers. 2 11
Judicial systems can still send incentive signals to Type II risk-creating
manufacturers even when it is difficult for government agencies to send
signals because of the low probability of injury. In the United States, esca-
lator accidents cause one or two deaths and 7,500 injuries per billions of
escalator passengers every year. Due to the low probability of occurrence,
208. Some advocates criticize manufacturers for sometimes manipulating the CPSC
standards for their own benefit. See Hood, supra note 7. For example, complicated bicy-
cle standards serve to protect domestic bicycle manufacturers from cheap or foreign-
made bicycles rather than to prevent bicycle related accidents. Id. at 16. As another
example, according to a study concerning the impact of mattress flammability stan-
dards, sales by small producers fell by 11% while those of large manufacturers rose by
44% as a result of the regulation. Id. at 16-17.
209. Barry Meier, Product Safety Commission is Criticized as Too Slow to Act, N.Y.
TmEs, Sept 21, 1991, at 46.
210. Id.
211. Id. The CPSC has spent $4 million since 1985 on ride-on lawn mower research.
Id. Additionally, the CPSC recently has decided to require manufacturers to produce
child-resistant lighters beginning in the summer of 1994. Lighters Required to Be Child-
Proof, N.Y. TisEs, June 10, 1993, at A25.
Vol. 29
1996 Product Safety Systems Comparison
the CPSC lacks the resources to analyze the risk of escalators; but potential
product liability suits may provide the necesary incentives for escalator
manufacturers to improve the safety of their products. 2 12
4. Enforcement
Whether signals from political institutions actually become incentive sig-
nals depends on their enforcement power. The frequency of prosecution
and the severity of penalties, whether fines or recalls, determine the manu-
facturers' incentives to reduce the targeted product risks. It is difficult,
however, to impose severe penalties through active prosecution unless
targeted risks are related to Type I or mass disaster-related Type II injuries.
This is because Type I or mass disaster-related Type II injuries tend to
result in a more forceful public call for government intervention than other
types of injuries. Especially when resources are limited, public officials are
less likely to prosecute Type II isk-creating manufacturers.
Theoretically, if profits gained while violating a law or a regulation
exceed the impact of prosecution (the severity of penalty multiplied by the
frequency of prosecutions), manufacturers may choose not to follow regu-
latory schemes. Nevertheless, once a law or regulation is created, it is
often more difficult for manufacturers to violate its requirements'- This is
partly because manufacturers may face more severe liability for future inju-
ries by violating the existing law and partly because violation of a law or
regulation can produce negative corporate and product image. Thus, the
enforcement power of product safety laws and regulations is often rein-
forced by judicial systems and market mechanisms. 2 13
B. Mechanisms of Japanese Political Institutions
1. The Role of Government
The characteristics of incentive signals created by Japanese political institu-
tions stem from the role of government in Japanese society. The japanese
government is the most powerful authority sending product safety incen-
tive signals. Several independent ministries or agencies enforce a number
of regulatory schemes regarding the safety standards of various prod-
ucts. 2 14 Each ministry or agency implements its regulatory scheme by
means of the government grant requirements (mandatory permission,
license or reporting requirements of ministries and agencies) and adminis-
trative guidance (informal orders of ministries and agencies). 2 15 These
standards, however, focus not on a risk/utility analysis of certain product
designs but on the standardization and certification of product quality and
212. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Escalator Dangers Called Preventable, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 1989, at 52.
213. See infra Part V (discussing the interrelationship of institutional mechanisms).
214. THE JAPAN CONSUMER INFORMATION CENTm, CONSUMER POLCY IN JAPAN 7-12
(1989).
215. See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
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design.216 The government strictly enforces these regulations.217
The Japanese government emphasizes that signals from this approach
have contributed greatly to preventing product related accidents in Japan,
even without significant judicial signals for product safety. 218 Foreign
countries have criticized these strict regulatory schemes as being non-tariff
barriers to the imports of foreign enterprises. 219 In response to American
criticism, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the most
powerful ministry with regard to industrial and economic policies, stated
its skepticism about the judicial signal-oriented approach and its reluc-
tance to change the current political signal-oriented approach:
The United States has been requesting that the Japanese Government allow
U.S. manufacturers to self-certify compliance with Japanese standards on
safety, etc. This suggests that we should adopt the approach of dealing with
accidents, etc., after the fact, i.e., through recall of cars from the market, civiljudicial procedures, etc. However, Japan's system on automobile accidents,
pollution, etc. has long been predicated on the idea that they should be pre-
vented before the fact .... 220
In spite of MITI's claims, the Japanese political signal-oriented
approach is also an after the fact response. The Japanese government has
created numerous regulatory schemes only after social problems related to
defective products were highlighted by the public (or consumer groups).221
In fact, the incentive signals created by Japanese political institutions focus
on Type I injuries and mass disaster-related Type II injuries, to which the
public is more likely to pay serious attention.222
In addition to Type I injuries, the government could prevent Type II
and Type III injuries by creating design and manufacturing standards and
by enforcing certification requirements. Moreover, these standards and
requirements would assure a certain product quality and exclude inferior
products before they reach the market. One of the serious problems with
this approach, however, is that extensive government intervention in prod-
uct design and manufacturing processes involves significant resources and
a transfer of costs to the taxpayer.
Indeed, the government's far-reaching control over products in Japan
sometimes has imposed a heavy financial burden on Japanese consumers.
216. One commentator has attributed the Japanese design standards and certification
system requirements to Japanese culture. Cohen & Martin, supra note 74, at 320.
217. See infra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 24. See also supra note 207.
219. Cohen & Martin, supra note 74, at 318-19.
220. Id. at 367 (citing MITI, REviEw OF STANDARDS AND CERIICATION SYSTEMS, Mar.
25, 1983, at 7) (emphasis in original).
221. See KEVZAMKAEI-CHO KoKuMNSmErATsu-KyoKu [SociAL Pouicy DIVISION: ECO-
NOMIC PLANING AGENcY], '92 HANDBOOK SHOHISHA ['92 HANDBOOK FOR CONSUMERS) 137
(1992).
222. The Japanese government's response to environmental issues is one example.
After several mass disaster pollution accidents, the government succeeded in controlling
environmental problems through its "vigorous regulation of all significant sources of air
and water pollution." FRANK UPnA, LAw AND SocIAL CHANGE IN PosrwA JAPAN 56
(1987).
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For example, car owners in Japan must have their cars inspected every two
years from three to eleven years after the purchase of a new car and every
year after that. The government also requires several additional inspections
through administrative guidance. 223 A car inspection costs approximately
100,000 yen ($979; $1 = Y102.18 in 1994) each time. 224 Assuming all the
cars in Japan are inspected once in three years, social costs for this inspec-
tion system are over $20 billion per year.225
Another problem with the Japanese political signal-oriented approach
is that extensive government intervention may narrow a manufacturer's
business practice options and, ultimately, a consumer's choice of products.
Most Japanese consumers, however, have not considered this issue to be a
serious problem. 226
The unique characteristic of Japanese political institutions regarding
product safety comes from the paternalistic role of the government. In
Japan, the government has served as "the risk-taker of last resort."227 Peo-
ple generally expect the government to provide high levels of security even
if a person's individual autonomy is consequently sacrificed.228 Lack of a
sovereign immunity doctrine in Japan illustrates this point. By apportion-
ing government liability, all consumers/taxpayers share the costs of prod-
uct related-injuries as opposed to only users of certain products sharing
costs through price mechanisms in the marketplace. Manufacturers
receive strong incentive signals from government regulatory schemes
because they can share substantial potential liability with the government
by being its subordinate. In their article concerning Japanese product
safety regulations, Professor David Cohen and Ms. Karen Martin describe
this risk allocation mechanism in Japan:
Allocation of risk of personal injury [through price mechanisms]... may
assume positive attitudes towards consumer sovereignty, an assumption
which may be less justifiable in the case of Japan than in some Western
societies. The Japanese may very well be willing to forego the welfare gains
associated with contract risk allocation in exchange for minimum safety
standards for a wide variety of consumer goods. Homogeneity of attitudes
towards risk may reinforce the view that a 'standard form' multilateral con-
tract with relatively rigorous safety standards is desirable. Social welfare
may be maximized by conscious directed decisions regarding product safety
rather than by atomistic market decisions. In dealing with risks to health
and safety, decisions to use market allocative devices, coupled with compen-
223. KAORU YODA, NINON NO KYoNINKAsBDO NO suBEtrE [JAPANESE GRANT SYsrEms] 26-
27 (1993). After 1995, the government will relax some of these requirements. Id.
224. Id.
225. As of December 1994, the number of cars owned in Japan was 65,122,026. Tele-
phone Interview with a Ministry Official of the Administration Section of the Ministry of
Transportation, in Tokyo, Japan (Apr. 30, 1996).
226. Recently, the Japanese people have started demanding fewer government con-
trols over their lives. James Stemgold, Thinking the Unthinkable, Japan May Curb Its
Bureaucrats' Power, N.Y. TnE~s, Sept. 13, 1993, at Al, A3.
227. Cohen & Martin, supra note 74, at 359 (quoting B. Rowland, Japanese Corporate
Behaviors: An Outside View, in U.S.-JAPANEsE ECONOMIC RELATIONS: COOPERATIONS, COM-
PETTION, AND CONFRONTATION 83 (D. Tasco ed., 1980)).
228. Id.
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sation through litigation, assume a positive answer to the question "Do indi-
viduals want to make the necessary and appropriate value judgment?" In a
society which is highly structured it may be that consumers would prefer
that experts replace them in that decision process. The benefits of certainty,
the avoidance of risk, and distributional considerations may be associated
with the view that "freedom from risk of injury" is a merit good which ought
to be allocated paternalistically rather than through the market.2 29
This public conception of powerful government has allowed the Japanese
government to regulate numerous aspects of consumers' daily lives,
although government intervention sometimes has imposed significant costs
on consumers.23 0
2. Willingness of the Government to Create Incentive Signals
A key issue concerning political institutions' incentive signals is the willing-
ness of the government to establish safety standards. Especially where gov-
ernment regulations are not related to Type I or mass disaster-related Type
II injuries, it is necessary to give the government incentives to impose
requirements on manufacturers, who usually have greater resources to
influence the political process than consumer groups.
The willingness of Japanese ministries to create grant requirements
and issue administrative guidance stems from their incentives to maintain
and expand their political authority. The more regulations a ministry can
implement, the more power it can exert. Conversely, decreasing the
number of regulations a ministry can implement means a shrinking of its
political power. 231 Therefore, each ministry tries to establish new grant
requirements and issue administrative guidance to protect its status injap-
anese politics. In 1992, the number of government grants was 10,942; it is
still increasing. 23 2
Moreover, creating government regulations often benefits certain busi-
ness groups. Therefore, once a ministry creates regulations, it cannot abol-
ish them easily because of strong pressure from protected business groups.
For example, the stringent auto inspection requirements generate enor-
mous profits for car inspection/repair businesses, which, as a result, have
acquired significant political power.23 3 Some commentators assert that the
government creates some requirements to protect the benefits of certain
businesses, not consumers,3 4 although these requirements may also
reduce product risk.
229. Id. at 363.
230. Recently, this strong government control has come under attack. Responding to
public demand for deregulation, some political groups are trying to ease several regula-
tions to reduce consumers' costs and improve their lives. See generally Sterugold, supra
note 226.
231. YoDA, supra note 223, at 14.
232. Id. Yoda states that 40% of GNP-related activities in Japan were regulated by
Japanese grant systems. Id. at 12-13.
233. Id. at 27.
234. Mopmmo HosoKAwA, NioNSHwNro SEamuN ARu HENAu [JAPAN NEW PARTY,
RESPONSIBLE PoImCAL REFORM] 107-24 (1993).
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The government's willingness to establish regulations is also related to
the characteristics of the administrative class. The Japanese government
attracts and retains the very best university graduates. 235 Unlike the Amer-
ican bureaucracy, which often loses its best young bureaucrats to the pri-
vate sector before they become effective officers, elite Japanese bureaucrats
stay with the same ministry until their retirement. 236 Because the Japanese
ministries can train their bureaucrats thoroughly, bureaucrats gain long-
term vision in policy-making as well as expertise in a particular area.
Japanese bureaucrats also enjoy tremendous prestige in national pol-
icy-making. The power-granting statutes for ministries are usually loosely-
worded and do not limit the ministry's actual administrative power.23 7
Therefore, bureaucrats can exercise substantial authority over all indus-
tries and place all relevant companies under their control. In addition, Jap-
anese bureaucrats enjoy significant protection from the consequences of
their actions because the judicial review of administrative law is quite
limited. 23 8
It is said that an essential condition for the survival of the Japanese
system is continued protection of the administrative class.239 Regardless of
the individual bureaucrat's personal goals, they either consciously or
unconsciously make great efforts to preserve the 'Japanese system," which
contributes to the preservation of their privileges. Their incentives to ask
manufacturers to compromise and establish detailed safety standards, even
when the regulations are not directly related to Type I and mass disaster-
related Type I injuries, may stem from their fear of the system's potential
collapse.
3. The Government Insurance Program
In Japan, the Consumer Product Safety Association (the "Association"), a
government agency, implements a product liability insurance program for
manufacturers producing certain kinds of consumer products. 240 This
program is called the "SG (Safety Goods) Mark" system. 2 4 1 The Associa-
tion sets certain safety standards for various kinds of consumer products
usually possessing Type II risks such as can openers and disposable ciga-
rette lighters. It also provides insurance for damages caused by these prod-
ucts.2 42 If users of these products are injured by product defects, they can
235. UPHAM, supra note 222, at 167.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 168-69.
238. KARE VAN WoLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, PEOPLE AND POLMCS IN A
STATELESS NAnON 215-18 (1989).
239. Id. at 112-13.
240. See generally SEmIN ANzEN KYOKAi [CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY AsSOcIATION],
SErN ANZEN KYOiAI NO GAiYO [THE SYSrEM OF THE CONsUMER PRODUCT SAFETY AssOcIA-
TION] (1992).
241. Id. at 7.
242. Currently, 92 kinds of consumer products have SG Mark safety standards.
Seihin Anzen Ky6kai [Consumer Product Safety Association], SG Mark Taish6 Hinmoku
Ichiran Hy6 [List of Consumer Goods which Have SG Mark Standards] (1992) (internal
publication, on file with author).
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recover their losses from the insurance program after inspection by the
Association.243 Manufacturers wishing to participate in this insurance
program must meet the Association's design and manufacturing stan-
dards.244 The Association provides SG Marks for products meeting the
standards so that consumers may know which products the program
insures.245 The funding for this insurance program originates from exami-
nation fees paid by participating manufacturers. 246
Under this insurance program, a committee of consumer group repre-
sentatives, manufacturer representatives, and others, decides safety stan-
dards for each type of product.247 The problem with this approach is its
slow speed in expanding the range of covered products. In the program's
twenty-year history, it has targeted only ninety kinds of consumer
products. 24 8
In addition, not many victims actually use this program. The Associa-
tion investigated only 727 cases between 1987 and 1991. Among the 727
cases, the Association issued insurance payments in only 339 cases, and
the average amount of compensation was 460,000 yen ($3,333, $1 = Y138
average exchange rate between 1987 and 1991).249 Since detailed informa-
tion regarding each accident is not available, it is impossible to determine
whether the insurance provided for the victims was sufficient. However,
the infrequent use of this program by consumers as well as the limited
types of products targeted suggests that fewer potential Type 11 risk-creat-
ing manufacturers are interested in participating in this program. As a
result, this program has had little impact on Type II risk reduction.
4. Enforcement
The enforcement mechanisms in Japan are quite distinctive. The strength
of incentive signals sent by Japanese political institutions cannot be mea-
sured simply by the frequency of prosecutions and the amounts of poten-
tial fines. Their strength derives, in large part, from the cooperative
relationship between government and business.
Unlike the United States, which has tried to eliminate close, informal,
and collaborative relationships between bureaucracy and businesses, 250
243. SE3HiN ANzEN KYOKAI, supra note 240, at 24. The maximum amount of compen-
sation is 30,000,000 yen ($270,075; $1 = Y111.08 in 1993). Id. at 7.
244. Id. at 13-14.
245. Id.
246. KEIu KucARu-CHO KOKUMIN SEIKATSU-KYO-KU SHOHIHA GYosEi DAIIcHI-cA [THE
FmIsT CONSUMER ADMINISTRATION OFFiCE, SocIAL Poucy DIVISION: ECONOMIC PLANING
AGENCY], SEZOBUTSU SEKININ TO BAISHO RIKO KAKuHO [THE PRODUCr LIABILITY SYSTEM AND
THE ASSURANCE OF COMPENSATION] 56 (1988). The fees are approximately less than 5/
1000 of the price of a product. Id.
247. SEIHIN AN ZEN KYOKAI, supra note 240, at 10-12.
248. Seihin Anzen Ky6kai, supra note 242.
249. Seihin Anzen Ky6kai [Consumer Product Safety Association], SG Mark Seihin
JikoJy6ky6 Baish6 SochiJisshiJydky6 [The Number of Accidents Reported for SG Mark
System and the Situation of Compensation] (1992) (internal publication, on file with
author).
250. UPHAm, supra note 222, at 201.
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the Japanese bureaucracy and business sector have attempted to create a
relationship of mutual trust and interdependence. 251 Bureaucrats and
business people have created personal relationships through an informal
and consultative policy- making process. 25 2 By emphasizing "the national
interest," the government tries to seek consensus among relevant corpora-
tions when determining the scope of regulatory schemes.25 3 The govern-
ment enforces the resulting regulatory schemes not only by using legal
sanctions but also by threatening collateral actions, such as denying
required approvals of plant expansion.25 4 Regardless of the type of risks
regulated, this approach to enforcement is common in all types of govern-
ment regulations, including ministries' informal dictates and administra-
tive guidance.
Administrative guidance does not have any legal basis, and ministries
are free to use this guidance at their discretion. However, administrative
guidance works as "a more potent weapon for regulating businesses than
the law."255 "Bureaucrats retaliate against companies that resist these
informal orders."25 6 Therefore, companies are implicitly obligated to fol-
low the guidance in order to maintain friendly relationships with the rele-
vant ministries, no matter what kind of product risks the ministries are
targeting.
5. Potential Problems of Political Incentive Signals in Japan
A number of regulatory schemes strictly enforced by the Japanese govern-
ment has contributed to product safety regardless of types of product risk.
However, the recent political situation in Japan indicates a possible change
of this political signal-oriented approach. In the national elections of 1993,
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had controlled political institu-
tions for nearly forty years, lost a controlling majority, 25 7 and a coalition of
other parties took power.258 The LDP's loss of ruling power ended the
long-lasting political stability in Japan that its forty-year rule had estab-
lished.259 One of the possible outcomes of this change in power could be a
weakening of the Japanese bureaucracatic system.
This potential weakening of Japan's bureaucratic system may be based
largely on the policy of "deregulation" promulgated by the new coalition.
Since the coalition came into power, too much governmental control has
251. Id. at 203-04.
252. Id. at 167-68.
253. Id. at 202.
254. Id. at 203.
255. Sterngold, supra note 226, at A3.
256. Id.
257. T. R. Reid, Japan's Top Party Loses Its Majority, WASH. Posr, July 19, 1993, at Al.
258. Yasuhiro Tase, Real Reform Requires Stand Against Bureaucrats, NnUCa WXLY.,
Aug. 16, 1993, at 2.
259. In June, 1994, the LDP regained power by forming a coalition with the Socialist
Party. Andrew Pollack, A Startling Choice, Socialist's Leap to the Top in Japan Endangers
Painfully Won Measures, N.Y. TuEms, June 30, 1994, at A10. However, the unstable polit-
ical situation still continues in Japan. Id.
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been the subject of criticism.160 Eliminating various governmental regula-
tions is now one of Japan's primary policies.26 1 Fewer regulations, how-
ever, mean fewer signals sent by the government. As the degree of
government intervention decreases, product risks previously reduced by
strict government control through its standardization and certification pro-
grams may now increase.
Moreover, the unstable political climate may undermine the enforce-
ment power of the Japanese government. Japanese bureaucrats were accus-
tomed to using privileged power over industry groups under the previous
stable political situation. If they now have to change their positions
depending on which party rules the nation, it will be more difficult for
them to maintain long-term relationships with industry groups.2 62 As a
result, the enforcement power of the government may also decline.
IV. American and Japanese Market Mechanisms as Incentive-creating
Mechanisms
This section analyzes incentive signals created by American and Japanese
market mechanisms. It first examines the capability and limitations of
market mechanisms, focusing on American market mechanisms, and then
analyzes the characteristics of Japanese market mechanisms.
A. Capability of the American Market Mechanisms to Create Incentive
Signals
1. Characteristics of Market Signals
In the marketplace, consumer demand creates incentive signals. If con-
sumers desire safer products and are willing to pay for better product
safety, manufacturers will supply safer products in pursuit of profits. Cor-
porate quality and design improvement policies often reflect consumer
demand. The degree of fear of losing profits and market share (or of
decreasing stock value), as well as a desire to increase profits, affects manu-
facturers' incentives to reduce product risk.
Manufacturers often attempt to perceive certain safety concerns imme-
diately, produce safer products that meet consumer demand, and stress
the safety of their products to attract as many customers as possible. For
example, responding to increasing concerns of parents about their chil-
dren's safety, some American child-goods stores have started focusing on
child safety-related products, such as electric outlet covers and an "auto
260. See Sterngold, supra note 226.
261. Id. Some experts predict that Japan will move in the direction of deregulation,
independently of who takes power. Andrew Pollack, Japanese Premier's Fall Forces Shift
by the U.S. at Trade Talks, N.Y. TmEs, June 26, 1994, at Al, A8. See also Andrew Pollack,
Japan Taking Steps on Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1994, at D2.
262. Andrew Pollack, From Tumult, New Visions Of Japan Inc., N.Y. TmEs, June 22,
1993, at D1. This change has not been accomplished yet. See alsoJames Sterngold, The
Men Who Really Run Fortress Japan, N.Y. ThmEs, Apr. 10, 1994, at 1, for the characteris-
tics of Japanese bureaucrats and their relationship with Japanese politicians.
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safety vest."26 3 These stores have currently expanded their U.S. market
share.26 4 Also, an increasing number of U.S. automobile manufacturers
stress their products' safety features as a strong selling point.2 65
As discussed in Part 11, manufacturers are quick to react to product-
related injuries that happen frequently, such as Type I and Type III inju-
ries. Since Type I accidents significantly harm manufacturers' product and
corporate images, their top priority is Type I risk reduction. Manufacturers
also try to improve the quality and design of products in order to eliminate
Type III risks and attract as many consumers as possible and maintain
customer loyalty.
Corporate efforts to eliminate highly probable risks can also contrib-
ute to Type II risk reduction. In particular, when manufacturers try to
reduce product risk arising from manufacturing defects through strict
quality control, they may also reduce Type II risks associated with manu-
facturing defects. Nevertheless, their cost/benefit analysis limits their abil-
ity to reduce manufacturing defects through high quality control. To
determine the "optimal" degree of quality control, manufacturers must
weigh the costs of the degree of quality control and engage in a cost/benefit
analysis between the probability of manufacturing defects and the costs of
reducing that probability. For instance, although reducing the probability
of manufacturing defects from five percent to one percent is cost-effective,
reducing the probability from one percent to one-tenth of a percent may
not be. The costs of implementing quality control will be less cost-justifi-
able as manufacturers reduce the defect rate of their products.
Considering consumer demand in the marketplace, manufacturers
sometimes reduce Type II risks through design improvement. Manufactur-
ers' voluntary efforts to create safe product designs are related to two
important factors: the perceivability of potential risks to users and how
sensational safety measures are (sensationalism). Perceivable product
risks are more likely to create incentive signals in the marketplace than
more hidden risks. In the marketplace, manufacturers can receive signals
based on whether consumers choose to buy products because they are safe.
Therefore, to send incentive signals to manufacturers, consumers must
understand, at least, what the potential product risks are and how feasible
safety measures are related to products' safety. For example, most people
know how airbags can save lives in auto accidents while they may not
know how the location of an automobile fuel tank is related to prevention
of fatal auto accidents. Therefore, consumers are more likely to consider
whether a car has an airbag as opposed to where the gas tank is located. As
263. Lawrence M. Fisher, Smaller Families Perhaps, But More To Buy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
8, 1991, at 10.
264. Id.
265. Among 29 advertisements placed by car dealers and manufacturers in Newsweek
issues during October, 1993 (Oct. 3, 10, 17, 24, 31 issues), 18 mentioned an "airbag,"
and 15 of them referred to "dual" airbags, while only one out of 38 advertisements in the
same magazine (Oct. 4, 11, 18, 25, 1988 issues) five years earlier mentioned any type of
airbag.
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a result, manufacturers are more likely to install an airbag, even without
threat of liability or penalties, than to change the location of a gas tank.
Incentive signals from the marketplace often encourage manufacturers
to take sensational safety measures. Even if potential accidents to the Type
II category, automobile manufacturers are willing to install "sensational"
safety measures such as airbags or anti-lock brakes in response to con-
sumer demand. Some automobile manufacturers even use scenes of inflat-
ing airbags in their advertisements to indicate their considerable concern
for safety. Selling new model cars that lack driver and passenger seat
airbags has recently become difficult.26 6
2. Comparative Analysis of Limitations of Market Signal-oriented
Approach
The perceivability of product risk and sensationalism of safety measures
suggest the limitations of market mechanisms in creating incentive signals
which target Type II risks. If safety measures are not for perceivable risks
or are not sensational, market mechanisms are less likely to send incentive
signals encouraging manufacturers to take such measures.
Although sensationalism is less likely to be a major factor in the polit-
ical process, perceivability may sometimes pose limitations in creating
incentive signals targeting Type II risks through political institutions. If
product risks are not perceivable, it is more difficult for consumer repre-
sentatives to enhance public awareness and to gain public support for their
legislative efforts. In contrast, the judicial system can create incentive sig-
nals regardless of perceivability and sensationalism because victims give
the judicial system an opportunity to create incentive signals by bringing a
lawsuit after incurring injuries.
In addition to the limitations associated with perceivability of product
risks and sensationalism of safety measures, three other serious limitations
prevent market mechanisms from creating incentive signals. First, con-
sumer demand can send signals discouraging manufacturers from reduc-
ing product risks because consumer preference often does not correspond
with product safety. For example, American parents tend to choose chil-
dren's sleepwear based on how comfortable it looks rather than on how
flame-resistant it is. In response to such consumer preference, more non-
flame-resistant children's sleepwear has entered the market.2 6 7
If signals created by political institutions are not supported by effective
enforcement mechanisms, political institutions also fail to send incentive
signals. Under U.S. federal law, children's sleepwear must meet flame
resistance standards, but the CPSC rarely has seized non-complying gar-
ments, resulting in more non-flame-resistant garments in the market-
place.268 Also, the judicial system may fail to send incentive signals if
manufacturers expect greater profits by making popular but dangerous
266. Jacqueline Mitchell, Without 2 Air Bags, Sales May Deflate, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12,
1993, at B1.
267. Barry Meier, How Safe Is Children's Sleepwear?, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 18, 1990, at 50.
268. Id.
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products than by making safer products. The American judicial system,
however, is more likely to send incentive signals than other institutional
mechanisms because such profit oriented corporate decisions may give
way to severe liability.26 9
The second limitation is the failure of market mechanisms to create
incentive signals which encourage manufacturers to take safety measures
to protect people other than buyers who are related to a product, such as
bystanders or, more specifically in the asbestos cases, asbestos installers.
Generally, consumers are not willing to "buy safety" in favor of other peo-
ple. For example, the number of passenger-side airbags is far lower than
driver-side bags.2 70 This limitation does not exist in political institutions
and the judicial system.
Finally, in market mechanisms, the income level of consumers deter-
mines access to safety. Since additional safety measures usually increase
the product price, only consumers who can afford to buy safer products or
improve the safety of products can enjoy these safety measures. For exam-
ple, renovating a house to eliminate the risk of lead paint may cost tens of
thousands of dollars.27 1 As a result, low-income people are limited in their
access to safety. Research on the death rate by "per capita income" shows
a trade-off between income level and the rate of unintentional deaths at or
near the victim's residence.2 72 The unintentional death rate for people
with a per capita income under $6,000 is more than double the rate for
people with per capita income over $14,000.273 (See Graph V)
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This limitation is less likely to exist in political institutions. If low
income groups are under-represented in the political process, political
institutions may fail to create incentive signals to protect these groups.
Safety issues, however, are usually major public concerns regardless of
income levels, and therefore the difference in victim income levels is less
likely to have an adverse impact on creating incentive signals through polit-
ical institutions. Similarly, the judicial system can function better as an
incentive creating mechanism than market mechanisms. Although the cost
of legal representation discourages low income victims from pursuing legal
action,275 the contingent fee system in the United States lessens their bur-
den and creates considerable incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring an
action regardless of the victim's income level. 276
B. Incentive Signals Created by the Japanese Market Mechanisms
1. Characteristics of Market Incentive Signals in Japan
Similar characteristics and limitations exist in incentive signals created by
Japanese market mechanisms as in those created by American mecha-
nisms. The characteristics of the Japanese market mechanisms stem from
Japanese manufacturing corporations' product safety policies.
To improve product safety, Japanese manufacturers have focused on
product quality control. The PSP survey below shows that Japanese manu-
facturers are more interested in quality control-related methods (e.g., using
checklists) for their product safety practices than U.S. manufacturers. (See
Table II)
Table 11277
Product Safety Programs Practices
Manufacturers selected all applicable answers.
Japanese manufacturers [1] (%)
1 Educating employees 49.4
2 Making a check list 47.9
3 Establishing safety standards 46.8
4 Making a safety manual 45.1
5 Reviewing the current user's manual and catalog 36.1
6 Estabishing a product safety division or office 27.4
7 Publishing a safety guide for users 1.1
Others 7.9
N/A 1.3
275. Diane Cabo Freniere, Comment, Private Causes of Action against Manufacturers
of Lead-based Paint: A Response to the Lead Paint Manufacturers' Attempt to Limit Their
Liability by Seeking Abrogation of Parental Immunity, 18 B.C. ENvTL. Ait. L. REv. 381,
409-10 (1991).
276. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
277. For data limitation, see Appendix I.
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U.S. manufacturers [2] (%)
1 Reviewing the current user's manual and catalog 72.9
2 Establishing safety standards 64.5
3 Educating employees 60.7
4 Making a safety manual 51.4
5 Establishing safety standards 48.6
6 Making a check list 42.1
7 Publishing a safety guide for users 37.4
Others 8.4
N/A 3.7
The strict quality control policies of Japanese manufacturers reflect
consumer demand for high quality products. In such a market, the
publicity surrounding any type of product-related injury can significantly
damage a product's image as well as its manufacturer's reputation. To
protect their corporate images, Japanese companies recall products
voluntarily, even without the threat of liability and penalties. 278 In the
same context, manufacturers can expand their market share if they have
strong policies regarding quality control. Therefore, many Japanese
companies have made great efforts to maintain product quality and to
improve product reliability. The following excerpt from an interview in the
film "People and Productivity: Learning from Japan" underlines this
corporate policy of high product quality:
The Japanese believe that quality is good and better quality is therefore bet-
ter than lesser quality. They will go beyond any sort of rational trade-off to
achieve this. For example, if you analyze the percentage defects in a process
and the costs of making that percentage less, you will very often find that it
makes sense to go from five percent defects to one percent defects. If you
then ask whether it makes sense to go from one percent defects to 1/10 of a
percent defects, the economists will generally say, "No, that does not make
sense." And the American firm will not, therefore, take that step.
The Japanese firm will. If you say to them, "That's silly. It makes no
economic sense," they will answer, "We don't care. Better quality is better
than poorer quality." Once they get to 1/10 of one percent, they will go to
1/100 or 1/1000 of one percent. Then they will look at you with a disarm-
ing smile and say, "That's what makes us such fierce competitors. You may
be satisfied with one percent defects, but we are not."2 79
Even where it is impossible to implement one hundred percent inspec-
tion, some Japanese manufacturers still reject a random sampling method.
Instead, they use alternative methods such as checking the first and last
part manufactured in every lot.28 0 Moreover, the Japanese practice of situ-
ating component suppliers near assembly plants is effective in reducing
product risk because assembly plants can trace the cause of defects
278. See Takumi Anzai, Fires Prompt Call for Product Liability Law; Manufacturers
Urged to Improve Safety Record, NncIm WLY., Aug. 15, 1992, at 9.
279. Cohen & Martin, supra note 74, at 362 (quoting Robert H. Hayes of Harvard
Business School).
280. Id.
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quickly. 281 In addition, Japanese workers "are known for their dedication
to the companies that offer them lifetime employment."28 2 Their efforts
contribute to high product quality. 28 3 By utilizing worker-participation
management programs, such as quality circles, Japanese manufacturers
have successfully tied employee incentives to company profits and produc-
tivity improvements. 28 4 A 1981 report concerning defective automobile
parts statistics strongly supported the superiority of Japanese manufactur-
ers' quality control strategies. The percentage of defective parts in
automobiles is usually 0.1-0.2% in Japan as compared with 1.0-2.0% in
North America.28 5
It may be argued that the company practice is not efficient because of
the significant costs involved in strict quality control. In fact, however, this
approach of quality control is cost effective. According to a Harvard Busi-
ness School study of American and Japanese room air-conditioners, a U.S.
air-conditioner manufacturer found 63.5 defects for every 100 units assem-
bled and made 10.5 service calls in the first year of warranty coverage. In
contrast, a Japanese company found less than one manufacturing defect for
every 100 units and made 0.6 service calls.286 Thus, the extensive quality
control system of Japanese manufacturers not only contributes to reducing
manufacturing defects that cause Type I, Type II, and Type III injuries but
also keeps the total cost of defective products extremely low.
. In addition to quality control, Japanese manufacturers have reduced
product risk by improving product design. In particular, they have been
successful in reducing Type III risks, such as user inconvenience and dis-
comfort. To reduce inconvenience or discomfort, Japanese companies cre-
ate new products to accomodate user needs. Examples include a voice-
operated VCR designed especially for senior citizens and a noiseless wash-
ing machine that not only benefits users living in condominiums, but also
their neighbors.28 7
The information necessary for design improvement stems mainly from
corporate post-sale customer service efforts. Because a manufacturer's rep-
utation for poor customer service can greatly affect profits, Japanese manu-
facturers have spent significant resources on customer service, providing
customers with a variety of remedies when products fail. 288 Almost all
Japanese products have a one year warranty on both labor and parts. Even
after the warranty period expires, manufacturers often bear the costs of
repairing or exchanging product parts to maintain customer loyalty.289
281. John Holuha, Quality Woes Bedevil Detroit, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 30, 1981, at D1.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Agis Salpukas, Quality Circles Aid Productivity, N.Y. TWEas, May 25, 1981, at D1.
285. Cohen & Martin, supra note 74, at 362-63.
286. David E. Sanger, Another No. 1 Rating to Japan, N.Y. Timfs, Aug. 25, 1983, at D1.
287. YUtmMo SUGNO Er Al_, CONcE r Nom 206, 208 (1991).
288. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
289. According to a survey conducted for retail stores selling electrical household
products, 35.8% of the stores incurred all or part of the product repair costs after a
product's warranty period had expired. KOKUMIN SEIKATSU CENM [THE JAPAN CoN-
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Through their customer service networks, Japanese manufacturers can
gather information immediately regarding customer claims. They then use
this information to improve product design and reduce product risk they
believe negatively affects their reputation. Large manufacturers need to be
responsive not only to Type I injury cases, but also to Type II injury cases
because publicity surrounding their failure to respond can damage their
corporate image.2 90
Japanese consumers may be willing, at the time of purchase, to con-
firm the safety of products they intend to buy because available legal reme-
dies are quite limited in case of accidental injuries. Japanese consumers
are concerned with who makes products. According to a survey conducted
by the Japan Consumer Information Center, only 7.9% to 14.8% of Japa-
nese consumers, at every income level, answered that they did not care
about brand names when purchasing "long-term consumer products."29 1
Fifty-one percent to 78% answered that they would choose a product based
on brand name.29 2 (See Graph VI) Because Japanese consumers tend to
buy high quality products regardless of their income level, low income con-
sumers' limited access to safety may not be as serious a problem in Japan
as it is in the United States.
Graph VI
Do you care about a brand name?
El I choose brand-name products. 0 It depends.
U I do not care about a brand name.
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YOBO [RErAILERS' RESPONSE TO CONSUMER CLAIMS AND THEIR REQUEST TO MANUFACTURERS]
18-19 (1991). Among retail stores incurring the repair costs, 78.4% asked the product
manufacturer for reimbursement. Id. In such cases, 75.3% of the manufacturers reim-
bursed the entire costs. Id.
290. See Ai Nakajima, Product Liability: How Tough a Law; Consumer Advocates Press
for Endorsement in Planned Interim Report to Prime Minister, Nuam WKLY., Aug. 31,
1991, at 4.
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2. Potential Problems of Market Incentive Signals in Japan
In the near future, Japanese market mechanisms will not be as effective an
incentive-creating mechanism as they were previously. First, Japan is
under pressure to open its market to foreign companies, and second, the
increasing value of the Japanese currency (yen) will enable more foreign-
made products to enter the Japanese market. (See Graph VII) Less expen-
sive foreign-made products, not necessarily examined under the same qual-
ity standards as Japanese products, could change Japanese consumer
demand for high quality products.293 Even if foreign-made products are
produced by overseas branches of Japanese companies, Japanese compa-
nies may be less able to ensure the same degree of overall quality control as
in domestic factories.294 Thus, it will be more difficult for consumers to
presume a product is safe when they base purchasing decisions on brand
names.
Graph V112 95
Value of the Japanese yen
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293. In response to the recent surge of the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar, a
deputy director of the price policy division at the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) stated that the surge presented an opportunity for U.S. companies to
increase market share in Japan if they reduced prices. Andrew Pollack, In Yen Windfall,
U.S. Companies Prefer Profits, N.Y. TimEs, May 5, 1993, at DI. American manufacturers
claimed that price reductions would not increase market share because Japanese con-
sumers focused on quality, not on price. Id. Japanese executives, however, said that this
notion of quality over price was outmoded, pointing to the recent success of American
computer companies in increasing market share through lower prices. Id.
For a discussion of the new attitude of Japanese consumers toward inexpensive for-
eign-made goods, see Sterngold, Japan's Rat Race-A Special Report; Life in a Box: Japa-
nese Question Fruits of Success, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 2, 1994, at 1, 6.
294. Satoshi Isaka, TV Recalls Raise Questions on Safety Control,JAPAN ECON.J., Apr. 7,
1990, at 15.
295. See supra note 70. Until just recently, the value of the Japanese yen against the
U.S. dollar was continuously increasing. In June, 1994, the U.S. dollar fell below 100
yen. Peter Passell, The Battered Dollar: The Impact, a Primer on the Dollar: The
Currency's Well-Publicized Decline Hasn't Meant Much for Most Americans, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1994, at Al. On April 19, 1995, the U.S. dollar fell below 80 yen on the Tokyo
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Furthermore, Japan's recent severe economic slump is inducing Japa-
nese companies to change an important aspect of Japanese corporate cul-
ture, "life-time employment," which has contributed greatly to the high
quality of Japanese products. Although mostJapanese companies have not
yet adopted this change, their management system is gradually chang-
ing.2 96 In the long run, this change could undermine employee dedication
to the company and consequently have an adverse impact on risk manage-
ment practices.
V. The Effects of Judicial Signals on Other Alternative Signals
In spite of the costly processes required, U.S. judicial signals have been
more successful than other types of signals in targeting Type 11 risks. In
comparison, even though Japanese judicial signals are not as stringent as
those in the United States, signals from Japanese political institutions and
market mechanisms have functioned as effectively in reducing product
risk. If Japan activates its current judicial system as an incentive-creating
mechanism, such a move might significantly improve the ability of the Jap-
anese product safety system to target Type II risks.
By predicting the possible impact of a more active Japanese judicial
system, this section analyzes that impact the incentive signals from judicial
systems have on political institutions and market mechanisms in reducing
Type II risks. Furthermore, this section examines how these signals may
influence manufacturers' product safety policies to target Type II risks.
A. The Effects on Political Institutions
If Japan activates its judicial system as an incentive-creating mechanism,
incentive signals from the judicial system could reinforce the effect of polit-
ical institution's incentive signals. Political institutions can create incentive
signals targeting Type II risks only to the extent that they react to public
opinion or public awareness of the risks. If the Japanese judicial system
were more likely to encourage victims of certain Type II injuries to use
judicial channels for remedies, the government would also have more
opportunities to create incentive signals targeting these risks. Type II risks
would receive public attention through litigation causing more isolated vic-
tims to possibly seek a judicial remedy. Public awareness of isolated prod-
uct risk would be further enhanced by such lawsuits, which could help
consumer representative activities positively influence Type II risk
legislation.
Because complying with government regulations does not exempt
manufacturers from liability, incentive signals from a judicial system moti-
foreign exchange market. Anthony Ramirez, Dollar Sets Lows vs. Yen and Mark, N.Y.
TnMEs, Apr. 19, 1995, at Al. Although the U.S. dollar has subsequently recovered above
100Y, the uncertainty in the exchange rate still exists.
296. Andrew Pollack, Shock in a Land of Lifetime Jobs: 35 Managers Dismissed in
Japan, N.Y. TnaaFs, Jan. 9, 1993, at 1.
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vate manufacturers to exceed regulated standards. 29 7 Due to the non-exist-
ence of the sovereign immunity doctrine in Japan, the Japanese government
has borne significant portions of liability in some Type I injury cases.
Therefore, manufacturers might not be motivated to exceed the standards
of government regulations targeting Type I risks. Courts are less willing,
however, to impose liability on the government in Type 11 injury cases. 298
Thus, if Japanese courts send more incentive signals targeting Type II inju-
ries, manufacturers will make greater efforts to reduce Type II risks, given
the small chance that the government would share liability.
B. The Effects of Judicial Signals on Market Mechanisms
Japanese market mechanisms have sent effective incentive signals through
strong consumer demand for high product quality and responsive post-
sales services. However, if the judicial system is given greater opportunities
to create incentive signals, the ability of Japanese market mechanisms to
reduce Type II risks will be even greater.
Incentive signals created by market mechanisms are successful at
targeting highly probable product risks, such as Type I and III risks.
Although increasing reliability and improving product design for Type I
and III risk reduction can also contribute to the reduction of Type II risks,
incentive signals created by the judicial system may encourage manufactur-
ers to focus more on reducing Type II risks. Because the reduction of Type
II risks sometimes can create Type III risks, such as user inconvenience,
manufacturers are less likely to reduce Type II risks if the judicial system
does not send them strong incentive signals. For example, in the Kamezaki
case discussed in Part 111,299 the primary reason for not installing the inex-
pensive safety device stabilizing the back of a passenger seat was not to
reduce costs but rather to increase customer convenience by making access
to the rear seat easier.300
Incentive signals from the judicial system can change a manufacturer's
product safety incentive signals from Type III risk reduction orientation to
Type II risk reduction orientation. In a survey conducted for American
manufacturers regarding their approach to risk management (in which a
majority of manufacturers agreed to the active intervention of trial lawyers
in Type II accidents as well as large jury awards), 87.9% of American man-
ufacturers responded that their current safety programs focused more on
Type II risk reduction than on Type III risk reduction. 301 (See Graph VIII)
If Japanese manufacturers have more opportunities to receive incentive sig-
297. Judgment of Feb. 4, 1975, Yokohama ChisaL, 324 I-IwrA, at 270-71 (1975)
(Japan).
298. See Judgment of October 20, 1983, Saikosai [Supreme Court], 1102 HANji 48
(1983) (Japan).
299. See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
300. Judgment of Feb. 4, 1975, Yokohama Chisai, 324 HANrA 268, 270 (1975)
(Japan).
301. This information is based on a survey conducted for manufacturers participating
in The Roles of Warnings and Instructions Program in Madison, WI, (Sept. 15-17,
1993). See Appendix H.
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nals from the judicial system, they would be more likely to place a higher
priority on reducing Type 11 risks than on reducing Type III risks.
Graph VIII
Q. Choosing between A and B, two different approaches to risk reduc-
tion, which one more closely describes your company's current safety
program?
A. Reduction of product risk which may cause serious accidents
even though the probability of the accident is low.
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Number of responding manufacturers - 33
C. The Effects of Judicial Signals on Corporate Policies
Strong incentive signals from judicial systems lead manufacturers to take a
more organized approach toward comprehensive product safety. Recently,
American courts have required manufacturers to institutionalize adequate
"regular safety procedures" or a "formal safety review committee."302
Responding to these incentive signals, some American companies have
developed product safety programs, in which they analyze how they can
improve the safety of their products or which product risks they should
eliminate. 30 3 The PSP survey showed that 58.9% of American manufactur-
ing companies have formal product safety programs as opposed to 40.2%
which do not.30 4
In contrast, such programs are not common in Japan. According to a
survey conducted for Japanese manufacturing companies, 36% had prod-
302. Owen, supra note 148, at 35.
303. See generally CONFEREN cE BOARD, TH PRODUCT SA-I FUNCTION: ORGANIZATION
AND OPEATIONS (1979).
304. See Appendix I. In the same survey, 68.2% of manufacturers responded that
litigation fees were one of their most important concerns. See note 22 and accompany-
ing Table L
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uct safety programs, 41% did not have such programs, and 21% were plan-
ning to establish such programs, projecting possible enactment of a
product liability law.305 This survey indicates that in Japan, where incen-
tive signals from political institutions and market mechanisms are signifi-
cant, some manufacturers have product safety programs even without
strong judicial signals. However, incentive signals coming from the judi-
cial system will undoubtedly increase the number of manufacturers with
safety programs. (See Graph IX)
Graph IX








Number of responding manufacturers:
Japan: 930 U.S.: 107
Stronger incentive signals from a judicial system can lead manufactur-
ers to establish comprehensive and systematic strategies for improving
product safety. Without such comprehensive and systematic safety poli-
cies, manufacturers may focus solely on high probability risk reduction in
the pursuit of profits. If the Japanese judicial system had more opportuni-
ties to send stringent incentive signals, more Japanese manufacturers
would take an organized approach toward product safety and would adjust
their policies from targeting Type III risk reduction to targeting Type II risk
reduction through continuous corporate programs promoting product
safety.
Conclusion
Judicial systems, political institutions, and market mechanisms in the
United States and Japan have created incentive signals targeting various
types of product risks. Different characteristics of these institutional
mechanisms in both countries suggest alternative approaches to encourage
manufacturers to improve product safety. Institutional mechanisms in
both countries have succeeded in reducing Type I risks, those which have a
high probability of causing severe injury. In a competitive market, manu-
facturers also attempt to reduce Type III risks, which cause minor injury or
305. AIU INSURPANCE COMPANY, supra note 21, at 6. When this survey was conducted,
the Japanese Product Liability Law had not been enacted.
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inconvenience. Nevertheless, there are serious limits on the ability of each
incentive mechanism to target Type 11 risks, which cause severe injuries but
with low probability.
To target Type 11 risks, the United States has frequently used the judi-
cial system as an incentive-creating mechanism. Various characteristics of
the American judicial system, including lawyers, legal theories, and deci-
sion makers, have contributed to sending more effective incentive signals to
Type II risk-creating manufacturers than have other institutional mecha-
nisms. In targeting Type II risks, incentive signals from the American judi-
cial system have overcome the limitations of political institutions or market
mechanisms in targeting such risks. More importantly, as the media and
political propaganda created by tort reform supporters label the current
state of the American product liability litigation as a "crisis" or "explosion,"
manufacturers receive stronger incentive signals.
However, if incentive signals from the judicial system are too strong,
manufacturers will lead political institutions to limit such incentive signals
by pushing for and achieving tort reform, thus undermining the effect of
the judicial system as an incentive-creating mechanism. The tort reform
currently being discussed by the U.S. Congress may change the ability of
the American judicial system to perform effectively as an incentive-creating
mechanism.
In contrast, the use of the judicial system as an incentive-creating
mechanism has been more limited in Japan. In particular, the Japanese
judicial system has failed to target Type II risks. The small number of attor-
neys in Japan, and their limited competition, restricts victim access to the
judicial system, especially in Type II injury cases. Even though victims
could bring a lawsuit, it had been difficult for them to prevail without strict
liability-based tort law. In addition, the non-jury system often poses a bar
to sufficient recovery for victims in Type II injury cases at both the liability
and determination stages.
Extensive government intervention in Japan, however, has caused Japa-
nese political institutions to send incentive signals more effectively than
American political institutions. Additionally, in the Japanese marketplace,
consumer demand for better quality creates strong incentive signals for
manufacturers to reduce product risks. Nevertheless, it is questionable
whether Japan will be able to maintain these affirmative effects of the polit-
ical and market signal-oriented approaches in the future.
With the end of the stable one-party ruling, Japanese political institu-
tions may not be able to preserve their strong bureaucracy and long-term
relationship with industry groups. While the new government policy of
"deregulation" can contribute to improving consumers' standard of living
by making products less costly, it also will reduce the ability of Japanese
political institutions to serve as incentive-creating mechanisms.
It will also be more difficult for market mechanisms to send strong
incentive signals. As less costly foreign-made products become available in
Japan, the traditional quality-focused consumer demand may fade. Fur-
thermore, internationalization of Japanese companies makes strict quality
. 143
Cornell International Law Journal
control more difficult. In addition, possible changes in the employment
system of Japanese companies may also undermine the function of Japa-
nese market mechanisms as incentive-creating mechanisms.
Japan's newly enacted product liability law, which adopts strict liabil-
ity in product liability cases, will open the door to a judicial signal-oriented
approach to promote product safety. Strong incentive signals from the
judicial system are more likely to target Type II risks and will lead manu-
facturers to increase their focus on reducing them. Also, such incentive
signals will encourage Japanese manufacturers to take a more organized
approach to promoting product safety.
The Product Liability Law, however, will be just the first step in a new
approach to promoting product safety in Japan. Even if Japanese courts can
utilize the new law, they still would face serious limitations in creating
stringent incentive signals, especially those targeting Type II risks. There-
fore, Japan must consider overall reform of the judicial system to be able to
utilize it as a more effective incentive-creating mechanism. Subjects of the
reform should include the system of lawyers and decision makers, and
other procedural systems that tend to limit the opportunities where the Jap-
anese judicial system could function as an incentive-creating mechanism.
If Japan could use the combination of the political, market, and judicial
institutional mechanisms more effectively by activating its judicial system,
it would be able to promote comprehensive product safety more success-
fully in the long run.
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Appendix I
The Report of Corporate Policy for Product Safety
The survey QUESTIONNAIRE REGARDING PRODUCT SAFETY POLICY OF MAN-
UFACTURING COMPANY (the "PSP" survey) was conducted at nine product
safety conferences held by the Department of Engineering Professional
Development and College of Engineering at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison between November 1992 and October 1993. This report contains
information gathered from the corporate representatives of 107 American
manufacturing companies who participated in the following product safety
conferences: "The Fourth Annual Product Liability Conference for Engi-
neers" (November 5-6, 1992); "Establishing and Implementing the Product
Safety Program" (February 1-3 and August 2-4, 1993); and "The Role of
Warnings and Instructions" (March 18-19 and September 15-17, 1993).
The focus of each conference was corporate strategies for product safety
practices.
To avoid serious bias against litigation, this report excludes data col-
lected from participants in the following three litigation tactics/manage-
ment-oriented programs: "The Successful Defense of a Product Liability
Lawsuit" (April 5-6, 1993); "Training the Engineering Expert Witness"
(May 3-4 and October 7-8, 1993); and "Litigation Management' (July 7-8,
1993). This report also excludes information collected from participants
in a conference covering international product safety standards, entitled
"Internationalization of U.S. Product Liability Practices-EC Directives"
(June 3-4, 1993).
Answers from companies other than manufacturing companies were
excluded. Only one questionnaire was collected from each company or
each division of a multi-industrial company.
I. About Responding Companies
1. Number of workers
Number of responding manufacturers - 107
Less than 50 3
50-200 26
200-1000 40
More than 1000 38




[Note: The original survey had groupings of "50-200," "200-1000" and
"more than 1000." The assumption is that companies interpreted these
groupings to mean "50 up to 200," "200 up to 1000" and "1000 or more
than 1000."I
2. Responding companies' capital amounts
Number of responding manufacturers - 107
(billion)




More than 50 7
N/A 16
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14.95%




9.35%/o More than 50
[ N/A
29.91%
[Note: The original survey had groupings of "100 million - $1 billion," "$1
billion - $10 billion," "$10 billion - $50 billion" and "more than $50
billion." The assumption is that companies interpreted these groupings to
mean "$100 million up to $1 billion," "$I billion up to $10 billion," "$10
billion up to $50 billion" and "$50 billion or more than $50 billion."]
II. Product Safety Program and Policy
1. Does your company have any formal product safety program?
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2. Does your company have any independent division, office, or person
in charge of a safety program?








3. Does your company have any division or office to which the
customers can easily have access in order to make a claim
concerning your company's product?









4. What kind of a product safety program has your company
implemented or is planning to implement? (Circle all which
apply)
A. Establishing a product safety division or office
B. Making a safety manual
C. Establishing safety standards
D. Making a check list
E. Reviewing the current user's manual and catalog
F. Educating employees
G. Publishing a safety guide for users
H. Other (Please describe)
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1. During the past one year, have you had any complaints regarding
your company's product?
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2. During the past one year, have you had any complaints that a user
of your product was injured or his or her property was
damaged?
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Lawyer User Other
4. If yes, how did your company respond to such an accident claim?
(Circle all which apply)
A. Compensation




F. Other (Please describe)









* The number of respondents who specified "litigation" in the category "Other."
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5. If yes, what did your company do to prevent future claims?
(Circle all which apply)
A. Research on users of the same kind of product
B. Recall of the same kind of products
C. Change the product design
D. Attach or change a safety warning
E. Nothing
F. Other (Please describe)








* Including the respondents who answered "retro-fit" in the category "Other." (The
number of those people are excluded from the number in the category "Other.")
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IV. Product Liability Lawsuit
1. What are your most important concerns in the event of an accident
involving your product? (Circle all which apply)
A. Criticism against your company (Negative reputation)
B. Litigation fees
C. Compensation
D. Negotiation with the victim
E. Reduction of sales
F. Costs for recall of similar products
G. Other (Please describe)
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2. Has your company ever experienced a product liability lawsuit?







3. If yes, how did your company resolve such a lawsuit?
(Circle all which apply)
A. Settlement
B. Judgment
C. Other (Please describe)
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Number of responding manufacturers - 91
A. Settlement 76
B. Trial (Judgment) 65
C. Other 19
N/A 4
Settlement Trial (Judgmend) Others N/A
V. Product Liability Insurance








(A and C)* 6
N/A 11
* The number of respondents who chose both A and C.
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10
0
A. Yes B. No C. Self-insurance N/A (A and C)
2. If yes, your company has product liability insurance for:
A. All of products
B. Almost all products
C. Only some kinds of products
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Appendix II
The following two surveys were completed by corporate representa-
tives from manufacturing companies participating in a product safety pro-
gram, "The Role of Warnings and Instructions" (September 15-17, 1993,
Madison, Wisconsin).
Survey 1
1. Choosing between A and B, two different approaches to risk
reduction, which one more closely describes your company's
current safety program?
A. Reduction of product risk which may cause serious accidents even
though the probability of the accident is low.
B. Reduction of product risks which often cause minor damages.
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Survey 2
What is your impression of the following comments?
1. "If your product causes serious injuries in an accident, trial lawyers
will try to bring a lawsuit against your company, even though






A. Strongly agree B. Agree C. Disagree D. Strongly disagree
A. Strongly agree B. Agree C. Disagree D. Strongly disagree
A. Strongly agree B. Ap-ree C. Disagree D. Strongly disagree
' A defect arising from a product which deviates from the standards of other same kind
of the products
2 A defect arising from an "unreasonable" design choice
3 A defect arising from failure to warn against potential hazard by adequate safety
warning labels or instruction menus
The number of responding manufacturers - 39
Strongly Strongly
Plaintiff's Claim Agree Agree Disagree Disagree N/A
Manufacturing Defect 21 15 1 1 1
Design Defect 23 12 1 2 1
Warning Defect 22 13 2 1 1
Manufacturing Defect If//// I
Design Defect §K[//1//A.t
Warning Defect,






2. "If your product causes serious injuries in an accident and your
company is sued, a jury will award a large amount for damages
for the victims, even though the probability of such an
accident is low."
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Strongly Strongly
Plaintiff's Claim Agree Agree Disagree Disagree N/A
Manufacturing Defect 17 14 6 1 1
Design Defect 18 12 5 2 2
Warning Defect 13 18 7 0 1
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